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Introduction 
In 2016, the European Union and its Member States experienced a very challenging year. The 
United Kingdom decided in a referendum to leave the European Union, the United States 
elected the anti-European and protectionist Donald Trump as its 45th President and Brussels 
and Nice were struck by terrorist attacks. The European Union also grappled with (the 
(aftermath of) the so-called refugee crisis which magnified the already existing deficiencies of 
the Common European Asylum System (hereafter CEAS). At the height and in the immediate 
aftermath of the refugee crisis, the European Commission proposed measures to overcome 
this crisis which consisted of establishing a joint list of safe countries, creating ‘hotspots’ in 
Italy and Greece with the aim of helping local authorities to examine the many asylum 
applications and setting up the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.1 But maybe more 
controversially, the Commission also desired to bring about a relocation mechanism for 
asylum seekers. In September 2015, the Council adopted two decisions using a qualified 
majority which stipulated that 160000 asylum keepers residing in Greece and Italy would be 
relocated to other Member States.2 This emergency relocation mechanism meant to be 
temporary was fiercely contested as evidenced by the fact that four Member States from 
Eastern Europe, namely Czechia, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania voted against the second 
Council decision which took place on 22 September 2015. The resistance against the 
relocation mechanism from these and other Eastern European countries did not disappear after 
the lost vote in the Council. Slovakia and Hungary supported by Poland went to the European 
Court of Justice and argued for an annulment of the 2nd Emergency Relocation Decision.3 
Moreover, the government of Hungary’s populist prime minister Viktor Orbán organized a 
referendum on the EU’s refugee relocation plans in 2016 and campaiged vociferously against 
the plans of the EU. This referendum turned out to be a disastrous waste of money as the 
required threshold of 50 per cent was not reached.4 But the opposition from Hungary and 
other Eastern European countries against any mechanism enabling a fair distribution of 
asylum applicants did signify that an ambitious and just reform of the entire architecture of 
the CEAS would be difficult to achieve. It was therefore not surprising that during the refugee 
crisis, the Commission and the Member States opted for a lowest common denominator 
approach by protecting the external borders of the EU through the establishment of the 
European Border and Coast Guard Agency and by externalizing European border control 
through the EU-Turkey Agreement.  
In 2016, it was not only the CEAS that faced formidable challenges but the EU’s Common 
Commercial Policy also encountered big obstacles. In October 2016, the regional parliament 
of Wallonia voted against the signature of CETA by the Belgian government in the Council 
which caused many headaches as CETA being designated a so-called 'mixed agreement' was 
 
1 Evelien Brouwer, ‘Rechtsgeldigheid van het relocatiebesluit en de betekenis van het solidariteitsbeginsel in 
het EU-asielbeleid’, in: Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht, No. 9/10 (2017), p. 219.  
2 Ibid., p. 220.  
3 Bruno De Witte and Evangelia (Lilian) Tsourdi, ‘Confrontation on relocation – The Court of Justice endorses 
the emergency scheme for compulsory relocation of asylum seekers within the European Union: Slovak 
Republic and Hungary v. Council’, in: Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, No. 5 (2018), p. 1458.  
4 Andrew MacDowall, ‘Voters back Viktor Orbán’s rejection of EU migrant quotas’, in: Politico Europe, 2 
October 2016.  
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seen as requiring joint unanimous signing and ratification by the EU and its Member States.5 
The ‘Wallonian Saga’ which almost hindered the signing and conclusion of CETA between 
the EU and Canada but was eventually solved through an intra-Belgian declaration6 severely 
tarnished the legitimacy and the effectiveness of EU’s trade policy. In the beginning of 2016, 
the Commission also had to trigger its rule of law framework for the first time against Poland 
when it announced that it would carry out a preliminary analysis of the developments taking 
place at the Polish Constitutional Tribunal. The events mentioned above and well-documented 
show that the EU faced a perfect storm in 2016 as the exclusive competences, the specific 
policies, the fundamental values and even the raison d'être of the EU were questioned by all 
sides.  
What went largely unnoticed is that national parliaments also made themselves heard in 2016 
by opposing one element of the ‘Social Europe’ agenda of the Juncker Commission or more 
accurately put the latter’s attempt to make a more social use of the internal market legal bases. 
In accordance with Protocol 2 annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, national chambers from eleven 
Member States issued a yellow card against the proposal to revise the Posted Workers 
Directive. By triggering the yellow card procedure, these national parliaments rejected the 
revision proposal on the grounds that it did not comply with the subsidiarity principle.7 Since 
the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, national chambers have been able to rely on the 
provisions of Protocol 2 to control legislative proposals on the principle of subsidiarity. The 
process set out in Protocol 2 is better known under the name ‘Early Warning Mechanism’ and 
consists of a yellow and a orange card procedure. If national parliaments believe that a 
proposal is not in compliance with the subsidiarity principle, then they have the right to send 
reasoned opinions detailing their subsidiarity-related objections to the initiators of the draft 
legislation. These reasoned opinions could culminate in yellow or orange cards if the 
necessary thresholds are reached. Up until now, not one orange card has been issued, whereas 
the yellow card procedure has been launched three times. The first two yellow cards were 
issued against respectively the Monti II proposal dealing with the right to strike and the EPPO 
proposal which envisaged the inauguration of a European Public Prosecutor. And the proposal 
revising the framework governing the posting of workers thus received the third yellow card.  
The focus of this thesis will be the third yellow card issued within the framework of the Early 
Warning Mechanism which is stipulated in Protocol 2. The thesis will answer the question 
whether national parliaments in their reasoned opinions which together form the third yellow 
card only paid attention to the subsidiarity principle and whether contrary to the text of 
Protocol 2 they also focused on other topics such as the legal basis, the proportionality 
principle and the substance of the proposal. The third yellow card has attracted academic 
scrutiny as is evident from the publication of various peer-reviewed articles containing 
different view points. These studies have respectively emphasized the issuing of the third 
yellow as a clear signal from East European national parliaments that they oppose ‘Social 
 
5 David Kleimann and Gesa Kübek, ‘The Signing, Provisional Application, and Conclusion of Trade and 
Investment Agreements in the EU: The Case of CETA and Opinion 2/15’, in: Legal Issues of Economic 
Integration, Vol. 45, No. 1 (2018), pp. 14-15.  
6 Ibid., p. 15.  
7 Katarzyna Granat, ‘The Scope and Application of the EWS’, in: Katarzyna Granat ed., The Principle of 
Subsidiarity and its Enforcement in the EU Legal Order: The Role of National Parliaments in the Early Warning 
System, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018, pp. 86-90.  
5 
 
Europe’8, the inadequacy of the Commission’s response to the third yellow card9 and the fact 
that the second and third yellow card were issued against proposals that did in fact respect the 
subsidiarity principle.10 As such, the thesis will be a literature study focusing on all the three 
yellow cards in chronological order and making use of primary and secondary sources. 
The first chapter in this thesis will describe the role of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon 
landscape and will show that the Lisbon Treaty has considerably strengthened the position of 
national parliaments. Moreover, it will focus on one of the main innovations of the Lisbon 
Treaty regarding the place of national parliaments within the constitutional architectrure of 
the EU, namely the Early Warning Mechanism. The origins, virtues and problems of the Early 
Warning Mechanism will be explored in detail. The second chapter will pay attention to the 
introduction and nature of the subsidiarity principle in the EU and will explain that the 
principle of subsidiarity consists of two sides: a material and a procedural one. Futhermore, it 
will elucidate the role of subsidiarity in the EWM and it will demonstrate that the centrality of 
subsidiarity in the EWM is questioned given the fact that the EWM is often interpreted both 
in a legal and political manner. The last part of the second chapter will be devoted to the first 
two yellow cards, focussing on whether national parliaments in these instances chose to 
interpret the EWM in a strictly legal or a political fashion. The third and last chapter will be 
solely dedicated to the third yellow card, whereby in the first section the Posted Workers 
Directive and the revision proposal will be reviewed. The last part of the third chapter will 
answer the central question of this thesis namely whether in the reasoned opinions that 
together comprise the third yellow card, national parliaments only focused on the subsidiarity 
principle or whether they also decided to review other topics such as the legal basis, the 
proportionality principle and the substance of the (revision) proposal. In other words, was the 
third yellow card characterized by a legal or a political interpretation?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 Diane Fromage and Valentin Kreilinger, ‘National Parliaments' Third Yellow Card and the Struggle over the 
Revision of the Posted Workers Directive’, in: European Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2017), pp. 125-
160.  
9 Davor Jančić, ‘EU Law's Grand Scheme on National Parliaments: The Third Yellow Card on Posted Workers and 
the Way Forward’, in: Davor Jančić ed., National Parliaments after the Lisbon Treaty and the Euro Crisis: 
Resilience or Resignation?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 299-312.  
10 Jacob Öberg, ‘National Parliaments and Political Control of EU Competences: A Sufficient Safeguard of 
Federalism?’, in: European Public Law, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2018), pp. 695–732. 
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1.  The Early Warning Mechanism: An Introduction 
 
On 10 May 2016, the threshold for a yellow card was reached. Parliamentary chambers from 
eleven Member States found the directive concerning the posting of workers in the framework 
of the provision of services not in compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. This directive 
was envisioned to amend the 1996 directive on posted workers in order to address unfair 
practices and to promote the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'.11 But the intervention of 
national parliaments made the adoption of the above-mentioned piece of legislation uncertain. 
The Early Warning Mechanism has been in operation since the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 and has 
thus far witnessed the issuing of three yellow cards. The first yellow card was issued in 2012, 
whereas the threshold for the second yellow card was reached a year later in 2013. The first 
yellow card was targeted against the Monti ii Regulation which aimed to regulate the right to 
take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom to 
provide services. In 2013, national legislatures wrote enough reasoned opinions within the 
eight week deadline to reach the threshold for a yellow card whereby they protested against 
the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office. In the case of the first yellow 
card, the efforts of the parliamentary chambers did pay off as the European Commission 
eventually decided to withdraw its proposal regarding the right to strike.12 Of course, one 
could debate whether it was the yellow card that forced the Commission to abandon its plan to 
regulate the right to strike. As stipulated in the second protocol of the Lisbon Treaty, the Early 
Warning System does not formally grant national chambers a veto over European legislation. 
After the second yellow card, the Commission chose to move forward with its plan to create a 
European Public Prosecutor's Office even though one third of national chambers believed that 
the EPPO legislative proposal contravened the subsidiarity principle.13 After the issuing of the 
third yellow card, the Commission also decided to continue with its efforts to revisit the 
Posted Workers Directive.14 But before discussing the third yellow card and the revision 
proposal against which it is issued, it is of the utmost importance to understand how the 
Treaty of Lisbon made national parliaments one of the 'winners'15 in the EU and to discuss the 
Early Warning Mechanism which is laid down in Protocol 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon. 
Therefore, this chapter shall discuss the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty that empowered the 
national parliaments. Moreover, it will explore the origins, virtues and problems of the Early 
Warning Mechanism.  
 
 
 
 
11 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 96/71/EC of the 
European Parliament and the Council of 16 December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services, COM(2016) 128 final, p. 2. 
12 Granat, ‘The Scope and Application of the EWS’, p. 80. 
13 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
14 Fromage and Kreilinger, ‘National Parliaments' Third Yellow Card and the Struggle over the Revision of the 
Posted Workers Directive’, pp. 152-154. 
15 Christine Neuhold and Julie Smith, ‘Conclusion: From ‘Latecomers’ to ‘Policy Shapers’? – The Role of National 
Parliaments in the ‘Post-Lisbon’ Union’, in: Claudia Hefftler, Christine Neuhold, Olivier Rozenberg and Julie 
Smith eds., The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2015, p. 675. 
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1.1  The Lisbon Treaty: Empowering the national parliaments 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon is regarded as 'the Treaty of Parliaments'16 as it empowered the 
European Parliament and the national parliaments in a significant way. Under the Lisbon 
Treaty, the co-operation procedure was abolished and the co-decision procedure became the 
ordinary legislative procedure. Furthermore, the ordinary legislative procedure was extended 
to new policy areas, making the EP (almost) the equal of the Council of Ministers. The EP 
was not the only 'winner' of the Lisbon Treaty as the Treaty changes of 2009 also gave the 
national parliaments a more prominent role in the European decision-making. Adam Cygan 
has even described the provisions in the Lisbon Treaty, thereby referring specifically to 
Article 12 TEU and Protocol 2 (annexed to the Lisbon Treaty) which grant national 
parliaments the role of subsidiarity monitors as ''the single most important development for 
national parliaments since their contribution was first recognised in Declaration 13 of the 
Treaty of Maastricht.''17 Declaration 13 of the Maastricht Treaty stated that greater 
involvement of national parliaments in the activities of the EU needed to encouraged. 
Moreover, it stipulated that the exchange of information between the EP and the national 
parliaments needed to be stepped up and that national parliaments should receive Commission 
proposals in good time for information and examination. Lastly, it emphasized that it was 
necessary to increase contacts between the EP and the national parliaments, in particular 
through regular meetings between members of parliament and reciprocal access to each other 
facilities.   
 
It is indeed the case that the Lisbon Treaty has significantly improved the status of national 
parliaments in the EU. The provisions of Article 12 TEU and Protocol 2 are however not the 
only stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty that have had or could have an impact on the workings 
of national parliaments as evidenced by the content of Protocol 1. In fact, it would be very 
difficult to fully understand the (new) role of national parliaments in the post-Lisbon period 
by solely looking at the provisions of Article 12 TEU and Protocol 2. Until the Lisbon Treaty, 
national parliaments mostly had an indirect participation in EU policy-making process as they 
were focused on controlling their national executives in the Council.18 This task has remained 
very important as can be seen from Article 10 TEU that talks about the democratic credentials 
of the EU. This Article clearly states that the functioning of the European Union shall be 
founded on representative democracy. At Union level, it is the European Parliament that 
represents the European cititzens, whereas Member States are represented in the European 
Council by their Heads of State and Government and in the Council of Ministers by their 
respective governments which are also accountable to their national parliaments and their 
citizens. The fact that governments which make up the Council are accountable to the national 
parliaments means that national parliamentarians have an important role to play in the 
scrutiny of their governments in the Council. National parliamentarians can indeed play a 
steering role in the Council negotiations as they can ask their governments to take their wishes 
 
16 Elmar Brok und Martin Selmayr, ‘Der ‚Vertrag der Parlamente‘ als Gefahr für die Demokratie? Zu den 
offensichtlich unbegründeten Verfassungsklagen gegen den Vertrag von Lissabon’, in: Integration, 31 (3) 2008, 
pp. 217-34.  
17 Adam Cygan, ‘‘Collective’ subsidiarity monitoring by national parliaments after Lisbon: the operation of the 
early warning mechanism’’, in: Luca Rubini and Martin Trybus eds., The Treaty of Lisbon and the Future of 
European Law and Policy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012, p. 59.  
18 Ibid., p. 57.  
8 
 
into account or they can authorise their governments to take a position from which they can 
not deviate. 
 
The provisions of Article 12 TEU and Protocol 1 and 2 of the Lisbon Treaty make it possible 
for the national legislatures to participate indirectly and directly in the decision-making of the 
EU. The Lisbon Treaty is the first treaty where the national parliaments are mentioned in the 
main text and not only in the Protocols and Declarations. The previous section showed that 
Article 10 TEU emphasizes the indirect role of national parliaments. Article 12 TEU for the 
most part lays down how national parliaments can directly contribute to the good functioning 
of the EU and confirms that national parliaments are an integral part of the EU’s composite 
constitution.19 It states that national parliaments contribute actively to the good functioning of 
the Union: 
(a) through being informed by the institutions of the Union and having draft legislative acts of the 
Union forwarded to them in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the 
European Union; 
(b) by seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected in accordance with the procedures 
provided for in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality; 
(c) by taking part, within the framework of the area of freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation 
mechanisms for the implementation of the Union policies in that area, in accordance with Article 70 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and through being involved in the political 
monitoring of Europol and the evaluation of Eurojust's activities in accordance with Articles 88 and 85 
of that Treaty; 
(d) by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties, in accordance with Article 48 of this 
Treaty;  
(e) by being notified of applications for accession to the Union, in accordance with Article 49 of this 
Treaty;  
(f) by taking part in the inter-parliamentary cooperation between national Parliaments and with the 
European Parliament, in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national Parliaments in the 
European Union. 
 
The most important innovation can be found in paragraph b that gives parliamentary 
chambers the competence to control European legislation on subsidiarity.20 But this new goal 
of seeing to it that the principle of subisidiarity is respected can only be achieved if national 
chambers are provided with the necessary documents on time and are engaged in some form 
of horizontal interparliamentary dialogue. That is why the incorporation of paragraphs a and f 
in Article 12 TEU should be applauded because these points are vital to make sure that the 
monitoring of subsidiarity by national legislatures which is also known as the Early Warning 
System functions smoothly and effectively. The fact that national parliaments now receive the 
draft legislative proposals directly from the European institutions thus means that it will be 
 
19 Leonard FM Besselink, ‘The Place of National Parliaments within the European Constitutional Order’, in: 
Cristina Fasone and Nicola Lupo eds., Interparliamentary Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution, 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016, p. 29.  
20 Tobias Lock, ‘Article 12 TEU’, in: Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert and Jonathan Tomkin eds., 
Commentary on the EU Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, 
p. 120. 
9 
 
easier to write reasoned opinions within eight weeks to reach the threshold for a yellow or 
orange card. Moreover, interparliamentaty cooperation between national parliaments is very 
much needed to encourage and convince other parliamentaty chambers to draft reasoned 
opinions within the eight weeks and to issue yellow or orange cards.  
 
Even though the EWM forms the most important innovation of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 12 
TEU makes clear that national parliaments also have other means at their disposal to take part 
in and influence European affairs. Paragraph c in Article 12 gives national legislatures a 
central role in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of EU policies in the area of 
freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation of the activities of Eurojust and in the 
monitoring of Europol in accordance with Articles 70, 85 and 88 of the TFEU.21 However, it 
has to be emphasized that in the post-Lisbon period national parliaments will have to share 
their powers to evaluate the actions of Eurojust and to oversee the activities of Europol with 
the European Parliament. Articles 85 and 88 of the TFEU which respectively describe the role 
of Eurojust and Europol explicitly state that the future evaluation and scrutiny of Europol and 
Eurojust will be carried out by the national parliaments and the European Parliament. 
Pursuant to Article 85 TFEU, Article 67 of the new Eurojust Regulation describes the 
involvement of national parliaments and the European Parliament in holding Eurojust 
accountable. In the recently adopted Europol Regulation, Article 53 entrusts national 
parliamentarians and members of the European Parliament with the supervision of Europol as 
stated in Article 88 of the TFEU.  
 
Furthermore, Article 12 TEU accords national parliaments a role in the treaty revision and 
accession procedures in accordance with Articles 48 and 49 of the TEU.22 Article 49 TEU 
describes in broad terms how any European state that respects the values of the Union as set 
out in Article 2 TEU and is willing to promote them can apply to become a part of the EU. If 
a state wishes to join the EU and subsequently makes an application, then the national 
parliaments will be notified of this application. At the end of the accession negotiations, 
national parliaments depending on their constitutional traditions also retain the possibility of 
not signing the Accession Treaty and thus blocking enlargement. Article 48 TEU stipulates 
that the Union Treaties can be amended through the ordinary revision procedure and the 
simplified revision procedures.23 With regard to the ordinary revision procedure, this Article 
lays down that the government of any Member State, the European Parliament and the 
Commission may submit proposals to the Council to amend the Union Treaties. If any of the 
abovementioned actors decides to send its concrete proposals to the Council, then the national 
parliaments shall be notified. The role of national legislatures could be augmented in this 
procedure but that depends on the calculus of the European Council. If the European Council, 
after consulting the European Parliament and the Commission, decides by a simple majority 
to examine the proposed amendments, then the President of the European Council will have to 
convene a Convention which shall be composed of representatives of the national 
Parliaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the European 
Parliament and of the Commission. This Convention will have the task to scrutinize the 
proposed amendments and adopt by consensus a recommendation to a conference of 
representatives of the governments of the Member States. The Convention method which was 
 
21 Lock, ‘Article 12 TEU’, p. 122.  
22 Ibid., p. 123.  
23 Lock, ‘Article 48 TEU, pp. 304-308.  
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first used to write the Constitutional Treaty in the early years of the noughties gives national 
parliamentents a lot of clout to change the Treaties and to transform the way the Union works. 
But at the same time, it is also time-consuming and does not give national governments a 
dominant role in the treaty revision procedure. Moreover, the last time that the Convention 
method was utilized to change the Treaties resulted in a disastrous result with the rejection of 
the Constitutional Treaty in the two founding Member States. That is why it is unlikely that 
despite the very democratic nature of this variant of the ordinary revision procedure the 
Convention method will be used in the near future.24 If the European Council does not want to 
convene a Convention, it has to decide this by a simple majority, after gaining the consent of 
the European Parliament. This second variant of the ordinary revision procedure is more 
likely to be used in the future as this method enables the national governments to remain in 
the driver seat and to fully control the revision procedure. This method which will likely be 
used to initiate a major overhaul of the Treaties enables the European Council to define the 
terms to the conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States. In this 
second variant of the ordinary revision procedure, national legislatures do not have the 
possibility to play a prominent and direct role and are relegated to the sidelines. They can of 
course put pressure on their own governments and the majority of the national parliaments 
also has the power not to ratify the amendments made to the Union Treaties. But these powers 
seem pale in comparison with the Convention method that provides national legislatures with 
direct and indirect avenues to influence the treaty revision procedure.  
 
The Euro crisis has also shown that Member States are not willing to resort to the Convention 
method or the second variant of the ordinary revision procedure when they wish to make 
small changes to one of the two Union Treaties. In 2010, at the height of the Euro crisis, the 
European Council decided unanimously after consulting the European Parliament and the 
Commission to amend Article 136 TFEU which enabled the Member States to set up a bail-
out mechanism outside the institutional framework of the EU by resorting to Article 48(6) 
TEU using a simplified revision procedure.25 The Heads of State or Government of the 
Member States were entitled to use this method because the amendment rearranged Part Three 
of the TFEU and it did not enhance the competences of the Union. In this variant of the 
simplified revision procedure, national parliaments have a limited role to play as they can 
only put pressure on their governments and they can choose not to ratify the proposed 
amendments. But the amendment of Article 136 TFEU made clear that time pressure and the 
important nature of the treaty change pushed national parliaments to ratify the treaty change, 
thereby proving the point that national (and regional) legislatures have very little room to 
manoeuvre when faced with this variant of the simplified revision procedure and are almost 
bound to agree to a treaty amendment. National parliaments do however have a greater say in 
the second variant of the simplified revision procedure also known as the passarelle clause.26 
This clause refers to a decision of the European Council made by unanimity and after having 
obtained the consent of the European Parliament to authorise the Council to act by a qualified 
majority voting in a policy area where unanimity is the rule or to provide for legislative acts 
which are governed in accordance with a special legislative procedure to be adopted by the 
 
24 Lock, ‘Article 48 TEU, p. 306. 
25 Willem Bovenschen, ‘Economische Monetaire Unie: schuldencrisis leidt tot fundamentele maatregelen’, in: 
Nederlands tijdschrift voor Europees recht, No. 5 (2012), p. 183. 
26 See Art. 48(7).  
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ordinary legislative procedure. When the European Council desires to move ahead with the 
passarelle clause, it has to notify the national parliaments. If one national parliament makes its 
opposition against the initiative of the European Council to use the passarelle clause known 
within six months of the date of notification, then the European Council can not adopt a 
decision using the passarelle clause to change the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union in a substantive way.27 In the passarelle clause procedure, national parliaments are 
expected to be strong and active individual actors and to have a greater propensity to use their 
veto powers because of the sensitive subject matter and the peculiar nature of the whole 
process.  
 
1.2  Subsidiarity monitoring in the post-Lisbon period 
 
As mentioned earlier, the most important innovation in the Treaty of Lisbon regarding the role 
of national parliaments was the introduction of the Early Warning System consisting of a 
yellow and orange card procedure. This mechanism allows the national parliaments to control 
European legislation on the principle of subsidiarity and enables them to voice concerns about 
the compatibility of European legislative proposals with the subsidiarity principle. Article 12 
TEU mentions that national parliaments contribute to the good functioning of the EU by 
among other things seeing to it that the principle of subsidiarity is respected but it does not 
provide details on how this subsidiarity monitoring system exactly works. The details are 
enumerated in Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and 
Proportionality also known as Protocol 2 that deals in its entirety with the EWS. But before 
outlining how the EWS functions, it is of the utmost importance to explain the origins of the 
EWS and to provide an answer as to why the national legislatures have become the most 
significant guardians of the subsidiarity principle. In order to understand why the national 
parliaments were given the competence to control European legislation (excluding legislation 
that fall within the Union's sole competences) on the subsidiarity principle, one has to look 
carefully at the nature of European integration in the last two decades and at the academic and 
political debates about the existence of a democratic deficit in the EU.  
 
It is an undeniable fact that the process of European integration has made some great strides 
in the last twenty years and that national parliaments in the EU Member States have seen their 
powers diminished. Not surprisingly, in the nineties and noughties, national legislatures were 
labelled as 'losers'28 of and 'slow adapters'29 to EU integration because they lost many 
legislative competences to the European level. According to some authors, the process of 
European integration and the strengthening of national executives at EU level led to the 
weakening of national parliaments (deparliamentization) in the EU.30 The Maastricht Treaty 
tried to alleviate the effects of deparliamentization by increasing the legislative powers of the 
European Parliament and by introducing the principle of subsidiarity. But the question 
 
27 Lock, ‘Article 48 TEU, pp. 307-308. 
28 Claudia Hefftler and Olivier Rozenberg, ‘Introduction’, in: The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments 
and the European Union, p. 1. 
29 ‘Major Findings’, in: Andreas Maurer and Wolfgang Wessels eds., National Parliaments on their Ways to 
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30 John O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio, ‘Introduction: Deparliamentarization and European Integration’, in: John 
O’Brennan and Tapio Raunio eds., National Parliaments within the Enlarged European Union: From ‘Victims’ of 
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remained whether these measures made the EU more democratic. In the academic literature, 
there was a clear schism between proponents and opponents of the democratic deficit theory. 
The supporters of the democratic deficit theory alluded to the fact that the European 
Parliament was too weak to control the European Commission and that the national 
parliaments did not have the necessary levers of power to exercise oversight of their 
governments in the Council of Ministers. Moreover, they pointed to the fact that the European 
Parliament did not have the right to make legislative proposals and that as a result, it was not 
able to play a prominent role in the decision-making process of the EU.31 These academics 
clearly worried about the lack of input legitimacy in the EU. However, there were also 
scholars such as Moravcsik and Majone who passionately defended the democratic track 
record of the EU. They argued that the EU was a regulatory state and that it had democratic 
legitimacy.32 Emphasis was put on the fact that constitutional checks and balances with a clear 
delineation of competences and the principle of subsidiarity played a significant role in 
preventing the EU from becoming a 'super-state'. Besides, national states and parliaments still 
had firm control over salient issues such as taxation, health care and social security.33 
Political debate closely followed and mirrored the academic debate and it intensified after the 
Maastricht Treaty. By the time of the Nice Treaty and the Laeken Declaration, many national 
European politicians wanted to give national parliaments more powers in the decision-making 
process of the EU in order to deal with the democratic deficit and the competence creep of the 
EU. They wanted to give national chambers a central role in the subsidiarity monitoring 
process because the national parliaments had lost many powers to the European level and they 
were seen as highly capable to detect local grievances about certain intrusive aspects of 
European legislation.34 During the Constitutional Convention, specific proposals were thus 
tabled that aimed to give national parliaments a central role in the policing of the subsidiarity 
principle and some politicians even talked about creating a third chamber consisting of 
national parliamentarians alongside the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.35 
This third chamber would have the competence to control European legislation on subsidiarity 
and would act as the political guardian of the subsidiarity principle. But this proposal received 
a lot of opposition from members of the European Parliament who feared that this body would 
become too powerful and would upset the institutional balance. Eventually, the participants in 
the Constitutional Convention reached an agreement as they called for the establishment of 
the Early Warning Mechanism. It is important to realize that the provisions relating to the 
Early Warning Mechanism in the Treaty of Lisbon are significantly different from the ones 
contained in the Constitutional Treaty. The Lisbon Treaty refers to a yellow and orange card 
system and gives national parliaments eight weeks to do a subsidiarity test and to write 
reasoned opinions if they find a breach of subsidiarity, whereas the Constitutional Treaty 
 
31 Andreas Follesdal and Simon Hix, 'Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and 
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32 Giandomenico Majone, 'Europe’s “Democratic Deficit”: The Question of Standards’, in: European Law 
Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1998), pp. 5–28. 
33 Andrew Moravcsik, 'The Myth of Europe's Democratic Deficit', in: Intereconomics, November/December 
(2008), pp. 331-340. 
34 Afke Groen and Thomas Christiansen, ‘National Parliaments in the European Union: Conceptual Choices in 
the European Union’s Constitutional Debate’, in: The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the 
European Union, p. 54. 
35 Ibid., p. 53.  
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rejected in France and the Netherlands only referred to a yellow card and allowed the national 
legislatures to draft reasoned opinions in a six weeks period. 36 
Despite the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty, COSAC (an interparliamentary body 
composed of members of national parliaments specialized in European affairs and members 
of the European Parliament) began a Subsidiarity Monitoring Plot in 2005 on the 3rd Railway 
Package to get familiar with and to test the subsidiarity system.37 The scrutiny itself of the 
various proposals making up the 3rd Railway Package did not happen in the COSAC meeting 
as the COSAC Secretariat only collected the reports sent by the national parliaments and 
subsequently presented the results. The problems that occurred in this experiment would also 
be visible later when after the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty the Early Warning 
Mechanism became operative. The fact that national parliaments did not identify the same 
problems with the legislative proposals meant that national parliaments did not have a similar 
defintion of subsidiarity. Furthermore, national parliamentarians not only controlled the 
proposals on subisidiarity, but also on proportionality.38 In 2009, the COSAC also monitored 
the subsidiarity tests conducted by national parliaments of two legislative proposals namely, 
the proposal for Directive Standards of Quality and Safety of Human Organs Intended for 
Transplantation and a proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the Right to 
Interpretation and Translation in Criminal Proceedings. Experience gained from these 
subsidiarity monitoring projects and active lobbying on the part of some Member States can 
explain why in the Lisbon Treaty the six-week period was extended to a eight-week period 
and why a orange card procedure was added to the yellow card procedure. 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Lisbon Treaty has two Protocols that deal with and 
comment on the role of national parliaments in the institutional framework of the EU. The 
first Protocol also known as the Protocol on the Role of National Parliaments in the European 
Union has a general scope and lays down the information rights and mentions subsidiarity 
monitoring rights of the national parliaments and it emphasizes that national parliaments and 
the European Parliament should together determine the organisation and promotion of 
effective and regular interparliamentary cooperation within the EU.39 As the EU is 
characterized by a complicated decision-making process, the provisions of this protocol 
regarding the information rights and interparliamentary cooperation do make it easier for 
national parliaments to exercise their individual and collective responsibilities. The fact that 
draft legislative documents are now sent directly to national parliaments by the European 
authorities enables national parliamentarians to better control their national ministers in the 
Council and to immediately start the proceedings of the Early Warning System. Moreover, 
interparliamentary cooperation whether it is between the different national legislatures or 
between the European Parliament and the national parliaments can be very valuable in the 
process of trying to influence indirectly or directly the European decision-making process.   
The Early Warning Mechanism which consists of a yellow and orange procedure and which is 
widely regarded as a tool that national parliaments can use to directly impact the Union 
decision-making process is described in great detail in the second Protocol. Articles 6 and 7 of 
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this Protocol explain how national parliaments can control legislation emanating from 
Brussels on the principle of subsidiarity. Article 6 stipulates that any national parliament may, 
within eight weeks from the date of transmission of a draft legislative act, send a reasoned 
opinion to the Presidents of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission in 
which it makes clear why it thinks that the draft legislative act in question contravenes the 
subsidiarity principle. Article 7(1) emphasizes that these reasoned opinions will be taken into 
account by the European Parliament, the Council and the Council. The rest of Article 7 shows 
how reasoned opinions can be translated into yellow and orange cards. In the EWM 
procedure, every national legislature has two votes which means that in case of a bicameral 
parliamentary system, each of the two parliamentary chambers shall have one vote each. In 
order to reach a yellow card, the reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a draft 
legislative act with the subsidiarity principle must represent one third of all the votes given to 
the national parliaments. This means that at least 19 of the 56 votes have to be attained before 
one can speak of a yellow card. If a piece of legislation is based on Article 76 of the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union on the area of freedom, security and justice, then at 
least 14 votes representing one fourth of the reasoned opinions are needed to reach a yellow 
card. The threshold for reaching a orange card consists of a simple majority of the votes and a 
orange card can only be issued for legislation that is governed by the ordinary legislative 
procedure.40  
After the issuing of a yellow card, the draft legislative act shall be reviewed and after such a 
review, the Commission or where appropriate another European instituition that has initiated 
the legislation may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the legislative proposal. Of course, 
reasons will have to provided for why a particular decision has been made. After an orange 
card, the proposal also has to be reviewed after which the Commission can decide to maintain, 
amend or withdraw the proposal in question. If it resolves to maintain the draft, then it will 
have to justify in a reasoned opinion why it considers the draft to be compatible with the 
principle of subsidiarity. This reasoned opinion together with the reasoned opinions of the 
national legislatures will be subsequently sent to the two legislators of the Union. Before the 
conclusion of the first reading, the European Parliament and the Council will to make up their 
mind whether the draft does comply with the subsidiarity principle, thereby taking into 
account the reasoned opinions of the Commission and the national legislatures. If the Council 
and the European Parliament by a majority of 55% of the members of the Council or a 
majority of the votes cast in the European Parliament believe that draft does not comply with 
the principle of subsidiarity, then the legislative proposal shall be taken off the agenda.41  
The yellow and orange procedure described in the second Protocol can seem dull and very 
technical for politicians and outsiders alike but it can in fact be a highly useful tool for 
national parliamentarians to exert more influence on the EU decision-making process and it is 
rightly regarded as a major innovation. The academic Ian Cooper has even argued that the 
introduction of the EWM has turned the national parliaments of the Member States into a 
virtual third chamber. He has written that the EWM has brought with it a new form of 
parliamentary involvement which deviates significantly from previous models such as 
Domestic Oversight, Parliamentary Assembly and Supranational Parliament.42 According to 
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this view, the EWM has through the creation of a virtual third chamber significantly increased 
the influence of national parliaments in European affairs and has enabled the national 
legislatures to gain a foothold in the EU that it had lost to the European Parliament 
(Supranational Parliament) after the Maastricht Treaty. The yellow and orange procedure does 
give national parliamentarians the opportunity to control European legislation on the 
subsidiarity principle and it puts them in a position to make a forceful intervention in the EU 
legislative process. In case of a yellow or orange card, the pre-legislative process will be 
temporarily halted as the Commission will have an obligation to respectively review the draft 
legislative act or to justify in a reasoned opinion why it finds the draft act to be compatible 
with the subsidiarity principle. Of course, this process can also lead to the abandonment of 
certain legislative acts as evidenced by what happened after the issuing of the first yellow 
card, thereby proving that national parliaments can directly impact European affairs.  
Besides giving national parliaments the opportunity to delay the EU legislative process, the 
EWM also aims to narrow the democratic deficit in the EU. Even though, it would be too far-
fetched to describe national parliaments in the post-Lisbon period as a virtual third chamber, 
the participation of national chambers through the EWM could however increase the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU decision-making process. Firstly, the EWM or better said the 
successful triggering of the yellow and orange card procedure provides national 
parliamentarians with the opportunity to directly shape European legislation. As mentioned 
earlier, in case of a yellow or orange card, the European Commission has an obligation to 
review the draft act and may feel pressure to accommodate certain wishes of national 
parliaments that they mentioned in their reasoned opinions. Secondly, the participation of 
national chambers through the EWM makes the pre-legislative process in Brussels more 
democratic because it creates a new link between the EU and European citizens and it enables 
national parliamentarians to formulate subsidiarity grievances about European legislation. 
Moreover, the EWM enhances the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament as it can 
emphasize that the legislative proposals enacted were controlled by the national parliaments 
in the pre-legislative phase on subsidiarity and that they enjoy the support of the national 
parliaments. Thirdly, recent research by Eric Miklin has showed that the introduction of the 
EWM has ameliorated the scrutiny systems in weak parliaments as it compelled them to focus 
more on European affairs.43 The EWM together with the Euro Crisis has thus led to a process 
of 're-parliamentarisation' whereby debates about the EU are taking place on a more frequent 
basis in national parliaments.44 Although national parliaments have not turned into a virtual 
third chamber, they are however separately from each other evolving into deliberative 
chambers where it is increasingly possible to discuss European legislation on substance.  
But the EWM also has many defiencies that have hampered the smooth functioning of the 
yellow and orange card procedure. Firstly, the eight week period in which national 
parliamentarians have to write and send their reasoned opinions is very short to expect a lot of 
yellow and orange cards to materialize. One has to realize that in the eight week timeframe 
national parliaments not only have to write their individual reasoned opinions but they also 
have to coordinate with other national chambers to actually issue a yellow or orange card. The 
fact that to this day only three yellow cards and not one orange card have been issued could 
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be attributed to the eight week period which is simply too short to incentivise national 
parliaments to write reasoned opinions to reach the necessary thresholds. Of course, the eight 
week period could be extended but that would lead to a further delay in the European 
legislative process. At the same time, it could also lead to an improved system of subsidiarity 
monitoring. There are also academics who have argued that the EWM does not function as 
originally envisioned. Pieter De Wilde has for example written that the EWM has not solved 
the democratic deficit of the EU. He points to the fact that the EWM obfuscates representative 
democracy in the EU because it creates uncertainty about the roles and responsibilities of the 
many institutions that make up representative democracy in the EU. Furthermore, he 
emphasizes that the EWM invites the wrong kind of involvement from national parliaments. 
He argues that national parliaments should be focused on controlling their governments and 
communicating with citizens and that the monitoring of the subsidiarity principle should be 
left to the judiciary and not to the national parliaments. According to De Wilde, national 
parliaments should not waste their time, money and manpower on writing reasoned opinions 
but should rather use these resources to communicate better with the citizens.45 Given the low 
number of yellow cards issued and the lack of interest among some national chambers, the 
EWM has indeed not functioned effectively and has not entirely managed to grab the attention 
of all national parliaments. It also does not help that the term subsidiarity is not defined very 
precisely in the European Treaties. As a result, national parliamentarians tend to have 
different views about the subsidiarity principle. One way of bringing the interpretations of 
national parliaments of the subsidiarity principle closer to each other would be to give the 
COSAC the competence to coordinate the subsidiarity tests, but the two Protocols make it 
very hard to let the COSAC play a bigger role in this process because of the individual nature 
of the EWM.  
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1.3  Conclusion 
 
This chapter laid out that the Treaty of Lisbon has considerably strengthened the position of 
national parliaments and this can be seen in Articles 10 and 12 TEU. Article 10 TEU states 
clearly that the Member State governments sitting in the Council are democratically 
accountable to their national parliaments, whereas Article 12 TEU is entirely dedicated to the 
role of national parliaments in the EU. This Article stipulates that national parliaments 
contibute to the good functioning of the EU by taking part in the revision procedures of the 
Treaties according to Article 48 TEU, by being informed of applications for accession tot he 
EU according to Article 49 TEU, by participating in the evaluation mechanisms for the 
implementation of Union policies in the area of freedom, security and justice according to 
Article 70 TFEU and by being involved in the supervision of Europol’s and Eurojust’s 
activities according to Articles 85 and 88 TFEU. Furthermore, Article 12 TEU expounds that 
in accordance with the Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the EU –also known as 
Protocol 1 – national parliaments will be informed by the institutions of the Union, they will 
be given the draft legislative acts of the EU and they shall partake in inter-parliamentary 
cooperation between national parliaments and with the European Parliament. But the most 
important and innovative provision ensconced in Article 12 TEU is the one dealing with 
subsidiarity monitoring as national parliaments are given the right to control draft legislative 
acts on the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the 
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality also known as Protocol 2. The subsidiarity 
monitoring system which is better known as the ‘Early Warning Mechanism’ (EWM) and 
which consists of a yellow and orange card procedure was introduced to lessen the democratic 
deficit of the EU and to hinder the process of competence creep. In this chapter, it was pointed 
out that the EWM has certain virtues and deficiences. On the one hand, EWM has the 
potential to increase the democratic legitimacy of the EU decision-making process and to 
delay the legislative process when national parliaments object to draft legislative acts. On the 
other hand, the EWM also has serious shortcomings as evidenced by the eight-week period, 
the difficulties to coordinate with other national parliaments in this short period and the 
obfuscation of representative democracy in the EU. The next chapter will focus on the nature 
of the subsidiarity principle in the EU and the exact role of this principle in the EWM. 
Furthermore, it shall discuss the first two yellow cards. 
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2.  The subsidiarity principle and the Early Warning Mechanism 
The previous chapter showed that national parliaments are encouraged to contribute actively 
to the good functioning of the European Union. More precisely, Article 12 TEU enumerates 
six main areas that reserve an important role for national parliaments in the European 
composite order. As elaborated in the previous section, national parliaments play a crucial 
role in the accession and the treaty revision procedures. Moreover, they take part, within the 
framework of the area of freedom, security and justice, in the evaluation mechanisms for the 
implementation of the Union policies in that area and they are involved in the politcal 
monitoring of Europol and the evalutation of Eurojust's activities. But the most important 
innovation of the Lisbon Treaty with regard to the role of national parliaments in the EU is the 
introduction of the Early Warning Mechanism that enables national chambers to police the 
draft legislative acts on the principle of subsidiarity. 
Whilst the previous chapter provided an introduction to the most significant elements of the 
Early Warning Mechanism, this second chapter intends to pay close attention to the principle 
that national parliaments are invited to guard in the Early Warning Mechanism, namely the 
principle of subsidiarity. Furthermore, this chapter shall take an in-depth look at the first two 
yellow cards triggered by national parliaments and at how national assemblies have 
interpreted the subsidiarity principle and whether they have limited themselves to the policing 
of this principle in their reasoned opinions. The first part of this chapter will deal with the 
concept of subsidiarity in the EU and the role of this principle in the Early Warning 
Mechanism, whereas the last two parts of this chapter are devoted to the first two yellow cards 
that were issued against respectively the right to strike proposal (Monti II proposal) in 2012 
and the European Public Prosecutor's Office proposal (EPPO proposal) in 2013. 
 
2.1  The origins of subsidiarity 
 
Subsidiarity which is a core constitutional principle of the EU can trace its origins to multiple 
societal and political traditions. It traces its philosophical underpinnings to the social teaching 
of the Catholic Church. The papal encyclicals of the 19th and 20th century were characterized 
by a vision for the society that emphasized the virtue of assigning to a higher and greater 
association only those tasks that subordinate organizations were not able to carry out. As 
Fabbrini has showed, this meant that the Catholic Church was against excessive state 
intervention as this would lead to a weakening of its own position in the society. Subsidiarity 
functioned for the Catholic Church as a panacea in its fight to jealously guard its own 
competences that were slowly being eroded by the new state structures. 46 
The subsidiarity principle also can be seen in two German political traditions on the structure 
of the state: liberalism and federalism.47 Article 72 of the German Basic Law which was 
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amended in 1994 because it was drafted too broadly stipulates that in the field of concurrent 
legislative competences, the federal entity should act 'if and to the extent that the 
establishment of equivalent living conditions throughout the federal territory or the 
maintenance of legal or economic unity renders federal regulation necessary in the national 
interest.' Vague elements of subsidiarity can also be detected in the liberal tradition of 
organising a state. The liberal dimension of subsidiarity can be summarized as follows: 
individuals and private groups ought to protected from unnecessary state intervention. Due to 
the fact that the liberal tradition is more concerned about the relationship between the state 
and its individual citizens than that between the state and its different components, it could 
also be argued that it is more accurate to classify the liberal concept of subsidiarity as the 
proportionality principle as the latter deals with the intensity of federal action rather than with 
the exercise of federal power.48 
As Nick Barber has correctly explained, there are important differences between the EU and 
Catholic concepts of subsidiarity. Whereas the former is narrower as it is more concerned 
with democratic public bodies, the latter takes an expansive view by being attentive to broader 
collective entities and society as a whole. Secondly, the EU concept of subsidiarity can be 
regarded independently from the Catholic one.49 As alluded to in the previous section, the EU 
principle of subsidiarity is constructed from different political philosophies such as liberalism 
and federalism and therefore cannot be seen as being concocted solely from the Catholic 
social doctrine. Many scholars such as Schütze and Fabbrini have written that the EU concept 
of subsidiarity as a general principle of EU law finds its philosophical origins in the theory of 
federalism and more specifically in German constitutionalism.50 They echo what Barber has 
already written down, namely that the centrality of subsidiarity in the Catholic social doctrine 
should not blind us from the rich sources that have influenced the EU principle of subsidiarity 
and the independent trajectory that this EU principle has traveled since its incorporation into 
the EU constitutional order. 
 
2.2  The inauguration and development of the subsidiarity principle in the EU legal 
order 
 
The principle of subsidiarity was introduced as a general constitutional principle into the EU 
legal order with the signing of the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Since its introduction, this 
principle has aimed to govern the exercise of Community/Union competences and to 
determine whether the Community/Union should exercise a certain competence which is non-
exclusive and shared. Prior to Maastricht, subsidiarity was mentioned in a couple of EU 
documents and was made part of the EC Treaty via the Single European Act (1986) in the 
area of environmental policy. It was only with the Treaty of Maastricht that this principle 
became applicable beyond the boundaries of environmental policy.51 Subsidiarity was hailed 
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as the word that saved Maastricht because it convinced hesitant Member States to ratify the 
Treaty despite the transfer of new competences to the European level.52 Its clarification during 
the Edinburgh Council together with new guarantees on issues such as citizenship and defence 
even managed to convince the eurosceptic Danes to back the Maastricht Treaty.53 Paul Craig 
mentions four reasons why subsdiarity was introduced in the early nineties into the EU legal 
order. Firstly, the subsidiarity rule was seen as an answer to the absence of a clear separation 
of different categories of competence in the Treaties and to the broad interpretation of Articles 
95 and 308 EC (now Articles 114 and 352 TFEU). Secondly, subsidiarity was regarded as a 
tool that would play an important and mediating role in the conflicts that would erupt between 
the Member States and the EU on the exercise of certain competences. It was also seen as a 
way to assuage the fears of Member States about a further federalisation of the EU. Other 
factors for the inclusion of subsidiarity as a regulatory buffer in the EU treaties related to the 
aims of preventing excessive centralization and increasing pluralism and the diversity of 
national values.54 It is also interesting to note that the incorporation of the subsidiarity 
principle into the Maastricht Treaty was championed by Germany, Belgium and the United 
Kingdom for very different reasons. The federal states of Germany and Belgium were 
adamant on its inclusion with a view to reassure the regional entities that were reluctant to 
transfer competences to the European level and to make sure that through the subsidiarity 
mechanism the EU would be held accountable domestically. The United Kingdom, on the 
other hand, saw the subsidiarity principle as a means to limit the scope of EU action and to 
maintain its legislative autonomy in areas which it deemed vital such as social, consumer and 
environmental protection.55 
Having laid down the differences between the EU and Catholic conceptions of the subsidiarity 
rule and the reasons for the inclusion of the aforementioned principle in the EU legal order, it 
is worth looking at the exact wording of the subsidiarity principle inserted in the Treaty of 
Maastricht and tracking the evolution of this principle with a special focus on its wording in 
the Treaty text, the two types of subsidiarity found in the respective Articles and Protocols 
and its operational implementation. The subsidiarity principle was given a fully-fledged 
formulation for the first time in Article 3B EC of the Maastricht Treaty. This Article read as 
follows: 
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in 
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale 
or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Subsidiarity became a general principle which was to apply to all policy fields outside the 
exclusive competence – a term that remained vague after the ratification of the Maastricht 
Treaty due to the lack of an explicity treaty scheme and which was clarified with the 
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competence catalogue of the Treaty of Lisbon – of the European Community. Furthermore, 
the Maastricht Treaty provided a democratic perspective of the subsidiarity rule, by 
stipulating in the preamble and Article A TEU the importance of taking decisions as ‘closely 
as possible to the citizen’.56 The formulation used in the Maastricht Treaty of the subsidiarity 
principle became the foundation for the wording that was put in the Lisbon Treaty. The 
subsidiarity rule can now be found in Article 5(3) TEU and reads as follows: 
Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the 
Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level, but can rather, 
by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level (emphasis 
added).  
The Article now also has a new subparagraph: 
The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of subsidiarity as laid down in the Protocol on 
the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. National Parliaments ensure 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with the procedure set out in that Protocol. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Lisbon Treaty, being ‘the Treaty of Parliaments’, 
gave the national parliaments the opportunity to control the subsidiarity principle when 
reviewing new draft legislative proposals in areas of shared competence emanating from EU 
institutions and Member States without, however, possessing a veto power. This marked a 
change in the way subsidiarity was henceforth going monitored as national parliaments 
became subsidiarity watchdogs whose task would consist of making sure that other EU 
institutions, and especially the European Commission (the initiator of almost all legislative 
initiatives) would abide stringently by the subsidiarity rule during the pre-legislative phase. 
Besides a substantial shift in the manner in which the monitoring of the subsidiarity principle 
would be organized, article 5(3) TEU of the Lisbon Treaty also contained two changes 
comparing with Maastricht: a substantive one a textual one.57 With regard to the substance, 
the Lisbon subsidiarity calls attention to the sufficiency of national action at ‘central level or 
at regional and local level’, whereas the Maastricht subsidiarity mentioned the insufficiency at 
the Member State levels as a criterion to answer the question whether supranational action 
was needed.58 The Maastricht subsidiarity formula was clearly blind to the idea that regional 
and local entities were capable of defining their own priorities and achieving the lofty 
objectives of actions desired by the European level by themselves. The texual change is a 
negligible one, as the phrase ‘and can therefore’ at the beginning of the second subsidiarity 
test found in Article 3B EC has been changed into ‘but can rather’ in Article 5(3) TEU of the 
Lisbon Treaty.59 Granat convincingly argues that this textual change does not alter the fact 
that both parts of the distinct subsidiarity tests are important in deciding whether EU action is 
necessary and that the difference in words between Maastricht and Lisbon does not therefore 
herald an adjustment in meaning. Moreover, she posits that the phrase ‘but’ in Article 5(3) 
TEU can easily be read as ‘and’, thereby emphasizing textual similarity and continuity in 
meaning between Article 3B EC and Article 5(3) TEU.60 
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2.3  The material and procedural dimension of the subsidiarity principle 
 
As can be gleaned from the Lisbon Treaty, the principle of subsidiarity has two conceptions: a 
material and a procedural one.61 The material dimension of subsidiarity can be found in 
Article 5 TEU and consists of two tests – the national insufficiency test and the comparative 
efficiency test – that EU institutions have to conduct to answer the question whether 
supranational intervention in a given situation is needed.62 According to the first test, the EU 
can only act if and in so far the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently 
achieved at the national level. The second test will only follow if it has been established that 
Member States have insufficient resources to achieve a certain policy goal.63 Lenaerts has 
argued that one Member State not being able to carry out a specific measure is enough 
evidence for the insufficiency of national action, paving the way for the second test to kick 
in.64 The comparative efficiency test is a ‘federal’ one and asks, having established the 
insufficiency of national efforts, whether the proposed action can rather, by reason of the 
scale or effects be better brought about at Union level.65 It is important to bear in mind that 
both tests have to be met cumulatively. This means that the EU is only allowed to take action 
if it proves that it can achieve the goals of the proposed action better than the Member 
States.66 Procedural subsidiarity refers to procedural steps that the EU institutions (especially 
the Commission) must enact in order to be able to show that the two tests stipulated in Article 
5 TEU have been executed in a satisfactory way so that it will become easier to assess 
whether Union action is needed.67 In other words, the thrust of the procedural subsidiarity is 
to make sure that EU institutions embark on a ‘process’ to make certain that the material 
dimension of subsidiarity is implemented.  
The evolution of the subsidiarity principle in the EU Treaties has shown that material 
subsidiarity emcompassing the “national insufficiency test” and the “comparative efficiency 
test” has not undergone fundamental alteration. This general framework for interpreting the 
relatively vague material dimension of subsidiarity has however been joined by several 
criteria which are meant to help EU institutions to apply this principle in practice. These 
operative criteria were developed during the nineties with the aim of clarifying the 
implementation of the subsidiarity principle and to reassure the Member States – which had 
just agreed with the strengthening of the supranational level –  that this rule would not turn 
into something futile.68 The new guidelines for the application of the (material) subsidiarity 
rule were laid down in the ‘Overall Approach’ which was annexed to the European Council’s 
Conclusions of December 1992 and which described subsidiarity as a ‘dynamic concept’, 
implying that Community action could be expanded or limited depending on the situation.69 
With regard to answering the question whether the Community should act – taking into 
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account the national insufficiency and comparative efficiency test – and whether the material 
dimension of the subsidiarity has been complied with, the Edinburgh recommendations listed 
the following points:  
- the issue under consideration has transnational aspects which cannot be satisfactorily regulated 
by action by the Member States; and/or 
- actions by Member States alone or lack of Community action would conflict with the 
requirements of the Treaty (such as the need to correct distortion of competition or avoid 
disguised restrictions on trade or strengthen economic and social cohesion) or would 
otherwise significantly damage Member States’ interest; and/or 
- the Council must be satisfied that action at Community level would produce clear benefits by 
reason of its scale or its effects compared with action at the level of the Member States. 
Looking at the Edinburgh guidelines, it becomes clear that these build on the Treaty text 
(Article 3B EC) and emphasize the importance of only initiating Community action if 
Member State action involves significant costs and if the supranational level brings 
tremendous benefits. In that sense, the ‘Overall Approach’ shows how difficult it is to clarify 
the subsidiarity principle and its application. It is therefore not a surprise that these guidelines 
were not revised when they were incorporated into the 30th Protocol of the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Although the Treaty of Amsterdam did not entail a new step in the clarification of the 
material dimension of subsidiarity, it did however esnure that the Edinburgh guidelines 
became legally binding (justiciable before the courts) due to their inclusion into a protocol 
and thus primary law. Moreover, it blurred the line between the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principle.70 Regarding the procedural concept of subsidiarity, the Amsterdam 
protocol took the same approach as with material subsidiarity; it maintained all the steps that 
the Commission needs to take when proposing legislation. It was now legally codified that the 
Commission had to conduct wide consultations before initiating legislation, include 
subsidiarity justification in its proposals, wherever necessary in an explanatory memorandum 
and to minimise any financial and administrative burdens for the Community and Member 
States.71 In contrast to the material dimension of subsidiarity, the procedural side of the 
subsidiarity principle has evolved a little bit from the nineties as evidenced by the fact that the 
impact assessment – introduced in 2003 – has emerged as an important part of the overall 
procedural subsidiarity package.72 The impact assesment can be added to the list of procedural 
steps such as road maps, explanatory memoranda and recitals in the proposal’s preamble that 
the Commission as the initiator of most legislative proposals will have to utilize to make a 
justification for the compatibility of its proposals with material subsidiarity. 73 
With regard to (the clarification of) the principle of subsidiarity, the Lisbon Treaty has not 
brought about a new era; in fact, it should be noted that Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty – the 
successor to Protocol 30 of the Amsterdam Treaty – has created a significant amount of 
confusion. Looking at the text of Protocol 2, it is indeed striking to find that the elucidation of 
the material aspect of the subsidiarity principle has been removed, whereas the procedural 
dimension of the subsidiarity principle has been left unchanged.74 This leads one to raise the 
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question whether the non-inclusion of the clarifications of the material dimension of the 
subsidiarity principle in Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty pinpoints to the fact that national and 
regional parliaments will have considerable freedom in the Lisbon era to define the principle 
of subsidiarity in a way that would suit and further their aims. As will be shown later in this 
and the subsequent chapter, a majority of national parliaments has indeed taken a more 
expansive view of the subsidiarity principle and the lack of guidance regarding the material 
dimension of the subsidiarity principle in Protocol 2 could partly explain this. Even though, 
the clarification of the material side of subsidiarity was not made part of the second Protocol 
of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission has stipulated that it will continue to follow the 
substance of the Amsterdam guidelines with respect to both dimensions of the subsidiarity 
principle. 
 
2.4  The subsidiarity principle: A legal and a political principle 
 
Notwithstanding the incomplete and imperfect nature of Protocol 2 with regard to the 
interpretation of the subsidiarity principle, this same document did mark the beginning of a 
new epoch when it came to the way subsidiarity was henceforward going to be monitored. By 
making national parliaments the new ‘subsidiarity watchdogs’75, the Lisbon Treaty sent a 
strong signal as to the political nature of the subsidiarity principle. Even though subsidiarity 
has always been a political and a legal principle, the implementation of this principle has 
predominantly been carried out by political institutions. The principle of subsidiarity is 
justiciable, but the ECJ has been very reluctant to interpret the material dimension of 
subsidiarity.76 It has been a little bit more willing to make a judgement on the procedural 
aspect of subsidiarity. The political and the legally vague nature of the subsidiarity principle 
has pushed the ECJ to take a cautious approach to the judicial review of the principle of 
subsidiarity.77 Moreover, it is said that the political agenda of the ECJ dictated by a desire to 
further the cause of supranational integration could be thwarted by the subsidiarity principle –
a principle that is often designated as ‘anti-integrationist’ for its tendency to hinder the 
exercise of shared competences by EU institutions.78 The difficult justiciability of the 
subsidiarity principle has prompted certain academic observers to question the role and nature 
of subsidiarity and its usefulness in preventing ‘competence creep’. Schütze acknowledges the 
political and judicial nature of subsidiarity, but he sees the political safeguard of federalism 
laid down in Protocol 2 as a ‘soft constitutional solution’ lacking a hard and fatally efficient 
core.79 Therefore, he contends that the judicial safeguard of federalism should be strengthened 
and that as a consequence, the definition of the subsidiarity principle should also be 
transformed in a fundamental way. He argues that subsidiarity should be understood as 
federal proportionality.80 He differentiates between the liberal and federal dimension of 
proportionality. Whereas the liberal dimension of proportionality which can be found in 
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Article 5(4) TEU stipulates that individuals and their private rights would be protected from 
excessive public interference, the federal aspect of proportionality located in Article 5(3) TEU 
could be relied upon to ensure that supranational action does not disproportionally restrict the 
autonomy of the Member States.81 In order to enforce the principle of subsidiarity as federal 
proportionality, the Court according to Schütze should opt for a hard constitutional solution 
by outlawing disproportionate interferences into national law-making autonomy.82 The arrival 
at this particular judicial destination would require the Court to embrace a stricter review of 
the subsidiarity/federal proportionality princple and thus to jettison its uneasy relationship 
with Article 5(3) TEU.  
Davies reaches the same conclusion as Schütze with regard to the importance of the 
proportionality principle in the EU legal order. But he is also far more dismissive of the 
concept of subsidiarity principle which he describes as “the wrong idea, in the wrong place, at 
the wrong time”.83 While Schütze subsumes the proportionality principle into the subsidiarity 
concept and transforms the interpretation of the latter., Davies is sceptical towards all aspects 
of the subsidiarity principle which he regards as a failed mechanism for balancing 
supranational and national interests. He argues that the central flaw of the subsidiarity 
principle is that “instead of providing a method to balance between Member State and 
Community interests, which is what is needed, it assumes the Community goals, privileges 
their achievement absolutely, and simply asks who should be the one to do the implementing 
work”.84 With a view to preventing a usurpation of powers by EU institutions, Union 
measures should be examined by the Court with regard to their compatibility with the 
proportionality principle.85 The Court should therefore act as a strict arbiter when confronted 
with cases in which national interests are pitted against supranational interests and should 
ensure that Member States interests are not encroached too much and are seen as equally 
important as Union interests. Davies’ plea for the use of the proportionality principle in 
competence allocation matters and for a decisive role of the European Court of Justice in this 
process has encountered criticism from the academic community studying EU law. Craig 
finds the competence-based proportionality review very problematic because it ignores the 
fact that the existing Treaties already provide a balance between Member State and Union 
interests.86 Moreover, it misses the daily reality of EU decision-making in which the 
formulation of an EU ‘objective’ involves a constant interplay of different political forces. 
The Commission tends to rely on extensive consultations before writing down an EU 
‘objective’ in its legislative proposals.87 Third, it ascribes a role to the proportionality 
principle whose legitimacy can not be derived from the Treaties.88 In other words, a 
conception of proportionality that emphasizes its independent competence role is 
incompatible with the Treaty schema. Fourth, a competence-based proportionality judicial 
review would encounter the same problems of adjudicaton that the subsidiarity principle has 
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faced.89 The Court will be very reluctant to strike down a European piece of legislation that 
was adopted using the qualified majority rule in the Council because a Member States simply 
believes that a specific measure was disproportionate. In Craig’s view, competence-based 
proportionality review attempts be a solution to a problem that does not exist for subsidiarity 
breaching is not a major issue in need of tackling. Lastly, if ever implemented, it will turn out 
to be ineffective due to a probable fact-specific approach of the ECJ with little precedential 
impact.90 
 
2.5  The legal and political interpretation of the Early Warning Mechanism 
 
The introduction of the EWM has underlined that the Masters of the Treaties are not 
convinced of the fact that ‘competence creep’ has become an obsolete matter. It has also 
shown that subsidiarity has de facto become a political principle whose control in the pre-
legislative phase has been entrusted to the Commission and national parliaments. The debate 
on the nature of the EWM is just like the discussion on the characteristics of the subsidiarity 
principle and its enforcement marked by a strong divide in the literature. This division 
revolves around the way the EWM should be interpreted. Should the EWM be explained in a 
legal or political way? To put in another way, should the EWM be interpreted in such a way 
that national parliaments are only allowed to control the legislative proposals on the 
subsidiarity principle or should national chambers have the liberty to focus on other elements 
in their reasoned opinions such as the proportionality principle, the legal basis and the 
substance of the particular proposal besides the subsidiarity principle? 
The case for a strictly legal interpretation of the EWM is made by pointing towards a set of 
textual, structural and functional arguments. Firstly, it is argued that a textual analysis of 
Articles 5(3) and 12 TEU, Article 69 TFEU and Articles 6 and 7 of Protocol 2 clearly 
indicates that national parliaments only have the competence to control draft legislative acts 
on the principle of subsidiarity.91 Secondly, a structural line of reasoning is concocted to 
support the view that the role of national parliaments should be restricted to the scrutiny of the 
subsidiarity principle.92 It is put forward that the phase prior to the signing of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty involved a lot of discussions among national and EU 
protagonists about the future role of national parliaments in the EU polity. During this period, 
many propositions were discarded such as establishing a third legislative chamber in the EU 
structure consisting of national parliamentarians and providing national parliaments with a 
‘red card’ to block EU legislation. Eventually, a compromise was reached that would see 
national parliaments becoming the new ‘subsidiarity watchdogs’ in order to democratize EU 
law-making and to prevent ‘competence creep’. However, the report of Working Group I 
(European Convention) on the Principle of Subsidiarity proposed a tailored EWM which did 
not mention other principles than the subsidiarity principle that national chambers could use 
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to evaluate draft legislative acts. The current design of the EWM is thus a conscious decision 
of the Treaty drafters with a view to limit the role of national parliaments to the pre-legislative 
process of the EU. Thirdly, a functional understanding of the EWM, comprising a 
comparative institutional analysis, is advanced to underpin the claim that the role of national 
parliaments, when scanning draft legislation, should be strictly confined to the review of 
subsidiarity.93 This viewpoint emphasizes that EU institutions should be performing those 
tasks that they are best suited to carry out in order to facilitate efficiency in EU policy-
making. As such, national parliaments are more capable than EU institutions to conduct 
subsidiarity checks on legislative proposals, whereas other institutions are deemed much 
better at assessing the content of a legislative proposal, its proportionality and its correct legal 
basis.94         
Proponents of a political interpretation of EWM contend that the scope of political control 
entrusted to national parliaments within the framework of subsidiarity enforcement should be 
broadened with a view to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the EU and to avoid the 
transfer of further competences to supranational institutions. According to this viewpoint, 
national chambers should be allowed to control draft legislative acts on other principles and 
criteria than the principle of subsidiarity such as the proportionality principle, the principle of 
conferral, the political merits of legislative proposals and the need to safeguard national 
constitutional values. Goldoni argues that a political reading of the EWM can be justified 
when seen in the wider context of the democratization agenda of the Lisbon Treaty and as part 
of a promise to boost representative democracy in the EU.95 He points out that Article 4(2) 
TEU explicitly protects national constitutional identity and that national parliamens should 
use the instrument of EWM to defend national constitutional essentials.96 Moreover, he 
asserts that it is perfectly legitimate to test the compatibility of draft legislative acts with the 
principle of conferral because the principle of subsidiarity only ever comes into play when it 
has been established that the Union has the required powers to act and that it shares these with 
the Member States.97 This also makes it very difficult to rely upon the subsidiarity principle to 
object to a draft legislative act that makes use of the internal market or the flexibility clause 
(resp. Article 114 and 352 TFEU) and that thus veers into the terrain of ‘competence creep’. 
In Goldoni’s view, the empowerment of national parliaments through the Lisbon Treaty 
should be thus seen as an encouragement to opt decisively for a broad reading of the EWM 
that integrates other elements in the reasoned opinions alongside the subsidiarity principle.  
Cooper and Jančić are also in favour of a flexible and thus political reading of the EWM. 
Cooper proclaims that an expansive political reading of subsidiarity could enhance the 
democratic legitimacy of the EU by giving national parliaments a greater say over EU law-
making and transforming them into a “virtual third chamber” in the EU constitutitonal order.98 
Jančić also posits that the current concept of subsidiarity examination does not hinder 
‘competence creep’ and that therefore a broad reconstructed EWM is needed to reduce the 
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democratic deficit and increase the democratic legitimacy of EU lawmaking.99 He contends 
that national parliaments, when scrutinizing draft legislative acts, should be allowed to make 
comments in their reasoned opinions not only on the principle of subsidiarity, but also on the 
principle of proportionality, the legal basis and the legislative substance.100 Kiiver sees the 
role of national parliaments in the EWM as akin to that of Councils of State in Member States 
which advise national governments on legislative proposals.101 The fact that Kiiver assigns 
national chambers a juridical role in the EWM framework does not mean that he is a great 
advocate for a narrow legal understanding of the EWM. Less equivocal than the 
abovementioned academics, Kiiver nonetheless argues that national parliaments should have 
the possibility to refer to other principles such as competence, proportionality and the duty to 
justify togerther with the subsidiarity principle in their reasoned opinions.102 The next section 
shall focus on the first two yellow cards and it shall show that the reasoned opinions which 
evolved into the first two yellow cards did not only limit themselves to the control of the 
subsidiarity principle but that they also dwelled on other principles and criteria. 
 
2.6  The first yellow card: Revolt against the Monti II proposal 
 
Before delving into the first yellow card (that was) issued against the Monti II regulation in 
2012, it is important to take a step and reflect briefly on the contents of the Monti II regulation 
and the CJEU jurisprudence (the Viking and Laval judgements) that preceded the Monti II 
proposal and that prompted the Commission to draft a legislative proposal to balance the 
economic and social dimension in the EU without however overturning the case law of the 
Court. A lot has already been written about the seminal cases of Viking and Laval and 
therefore it suffices to provide the most relevant aspects of these judgements without going 
into every single detail. In Viking and Laval, two fundamental freedoms – the right to provide 
services and the right to establishment – were pitted against a fundamental right, namely the 
right to collective action.103 The Court for the first time recognized the right to strike as a 
fundamental right, but at the same time it emphasized (thereby rejecting the Albany approach) 
that Articles 49 and 56 TFEU had horizontal direct effect and could be invoked against trade 
unions.104 Moreover, the Court, using the Säger market access approach, characterized the 
collective action as a restriction of the two freedoms but also argued that this restriction could 
be justified for the sake of worker protection.105 The Court then subjected the right to strike to 
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a proportionality test which in these cases functioned as a market integration mechanism and 
concluded that the collective action in the Viking case was probably not proportionate, 
whereas in the Laval case the collection action was considered definitely not be 
proportionate.106 
The Viking and Laval decisions ushered in a period of soul-searching involving all the 
relevant actors (Member States, EU institutions, social partners and academics). This resulted, 
among other things, in a report from the hand of Mario Monti on the single market which 
acknowledged that the Viking and Laval judgements ‘revived an old split that had never been 
healed: the divide between advocates of greater market integration and those who feel that the 
call for economic freedoms and for breaking up regulatory barriers is code for dismantling 
social rights protected at national level’.107 Monti proposed a number of cosmetic changes to 
the functioning of the single market such as better implementation and enforcement of the 
Posted Workers Directive, introducing a provision modelled on Article 2 of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2679/98 (Monti I Regulation) that would protect the right to industrial 
action in the context of the cross-border provision of services and setting up a system that 
would allow the informal settlement of labour disputes.108 These recommendations 
subsequently made their way into a document titled ‘Towards a Single Market Act’ in which 
the Commission took ownership of these ideas. In proposals 29-30, it stated that it intended to 
ensure that the rights guaranteed in the Charter, including the right to collective action, will be 
taken into account and to adopt a legislative proposal with the aim of improving the 
implementation of the Posted Workers Directive. In addition, it contemplated to clarify the 
exercise of fundamental social rights within the context of the economic freedoms of the 
single market.109  
It was on 21 March 2012 – a year later than planned – that the Commission unveiled its plans 
to put some flesh on the bones of proposal 30 of the Communication ‘Towards a Single 
Market Act’.110 It presented a proposal for a directive on the enforcement of the Posted 
Workers Directive and it submitted a proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the 
right to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services which is better known as the Monti II Regulation. According to 
the Commission, meeting the objective of the Regulation – the clarification of the general 
principles and EU rules applicable to the exercise of the fundamental right to take industrial 
action within the context of the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment, 
including the need to reconcile them in practice in cross-border situations – needed action at 
European Union level and could not be achieved by the Member States alone.111 The Monti II 
Regulation which had Article 352 TFEU (‘flexibility clause’) as its legal basis was relatively 
terse and contained only five articles –  with Article 5 designating the entry into force of the 
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Regulation. Article 1 defined the subject matter and stipulated that the Regulation shall not 
affect in any way the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in the Member States and 
that it shall not impinge on the right to negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements 
and to take collective action in accordance with national law and practices.112 Article 2 
formed the core of the Regulation as it laid down the principle that the exercise of the freedom 
of establishment and the freedom to provide services shall respect the fundamental right to 
take collective action and conversely, that the exercise of the fundamental right to take 
collective action shall respect these economic freedoms.113 Article 3 dealt with dispute 
resolution mechanisms and set forth that Member States which accommodate alternative, non-
judicial mechanisms to settle labour disputes shall provide for equal access to these alternative 
resolution mechanisms in cases where such disagreements flowed from the exercise of the 
right to take collective action in transnational situations involving the fundamental freedoms 
mentioned above.114 Lastly, Article 4 inspired by Articles 4 and 5 of the Monti I Regulation 
intended to introduce an information exchange system – alert mechanism – whereby a 
Member State would have the duty to notify the Commission and the other Member States of 
situations on its territory which imperiled the exercise of the right to establishment and the 
right to provide services and which had the potential of disturbing the functioning of the 
single market.115  
The proposal for the Monti II Regulation is less known for its contents than for the fact that it 
was the first proposal to attract a yellow card. The issuing of the first yellow card occurred on 
the last day – 22 May 2012 – of the eighth-week deadline with twelve national parliaments 
sending reasoned opinions representing in total 19 votes – one more than was necessary to 
achieve the 1/3 threshold to trigger a yellow card.116 An analysis of these reasoned opinions 
shows that national parliaments did not limit their scrutiny activities to the subsidiarity aspects 
but also incorporated other principles and criteria such as the legal basis, the proportionality 
principle and the political merits in their assessment.117 Numerous parliaments criticized the 
vagueness of the Monti II proposal and remarked that the Commission had breached the 
procedural dimension of the subsidiarity principle due to its poor justification for the respect 
of the subsidiarity principle.118 But the majority of the reasoned opinions did not focus on the 
principle of subsidiarity but commented on other elements such as those mentioned above.  
Many national parliaments opposed the Monti II proposal because of the legal basis chosen by 
the Commission. They argued that Article 352 TFEU was not the appropriate legal basis and 
that the proposed regulation did not meet the criteria enshrined in the flexibility clause as the 
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regulation did not set out which of the Treaty objectives it wanted achieve.119 Moreover, 
national chambers asserted that Article 153(5) TFEU rules out EU action with regard to the 
right to collective action and that therefore the flexibility clause was not interpreted correctly 
as Article 352(3) TFEU clearly stipulates that the flexibility clause can not used in cases 
where harmonization of national laws is explicitly not allowed.120 Put simply, the 
Commission was accused of acting in an area – labour law – where it did not have the power 
to legislate and which was seen as a national question “par excellence”.121 National 
parliaments also opined that the Monti II proposal was not in accordance with the 
proportionality principle. Certain chambers questioned the necessity of the proposal and the 
suitability of the proposal to achieve the Treaty objectives.122 Lastly, the reasoned opinions 
discussed the substance of the Monti II proposal. Especially, Articles 2 and 3 bore the brunt of 
this critique. According to national parliaments, Article 2 lacked clarity and legal certainty 
and had the potential to wreck well-functioning national systems in the area of labour law.123 
It also aimed to reconcile economic and social rights which clashed with the constitutional 
traditions of Member States.124 Article 3 which dealt with alternative dispute mechanisms was 
seen as unneeded as existing national mechanisms of dispute settlement were said to be 
working just excellent.125 
 
2.7  The second yellow card: The EPPO proposal caught in the crossfire 
 
The second yellow card followed a year later when on 28 October 2013 fourteen national 
chambers from 11 Member States sent reasoned opinions – representing in total 18 votes – to 
the Commission to protest the proposal to establish the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
(EPPO).126 With regard to the EPPO proposal, the threshold to reach a yellow card was a 
quarter of all the votes allocated to the national parliaments – thus 14 votes out of 56 votes – 
because it involved a proposal in the area of freedom, security and justice.127 The Commission 
based the proposal on Article 86 TFEU which unequivocally mentions the option to 
inaugurate a European public prosecutor to fight crimes affecting the financial interests of the 
Union. It argued that the objective of fighting the criminal offences affecting the Union’s 
financial interests could only be achieved at Union level by reason of its scale and effects.128 
 
119 Fabbrini and Granat, ‘“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national parliaments under the subsidiarity 
protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike’, pp. 136.  
120 Ibid. 
121 Goldoni, 'The Early Warning System and the Monti II Regulation: The Case for a Political Interpretation', p. 
98. 
122Fabbrini and Granat, ‘“Yellow card, but no foul”: The role of the national parliaments under the subsidiarity 
protocol and the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike’, p. 137.  
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Granat, ‘The Scope and Application of the EWS’, p. 79. 
126 Fromage, ‘The Second Yellow Card on the EPPO Proposal: An Encouraging Development for Member State 
Parliaments?’, pp. 5-6. 
127 Irene Wieczorek, ‘The EPPO Draft Regulation Passes the First Subsidiarity Test: An Analysis and 
Interpretation of the European Commission’s Hasty Approach to National Parliaments’ Subsidiarity Arguments’, 
in: German Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 5 (2015), pp. 1252-1253.  
128 Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor's Office, 
COM(2013) 534 final, p. 4. 
32 
 
The exclusive prosecution of these abovementioned crimes by national authorities was 
deemed not be satisfactory to achieve the goal of protecting the Union’s financial interests. 
The Commission advocated a decentralized structure of the EPPO whereby one European 
Public Prosecutor (EPP) would be supported by four deputies.129 Furthermore, the EPPO 
would have European Delegated Prosecutors (EDPs) in the Member States who would have 
the competence to conduct the investigations and prosecutions under the direction and 
supervision of the EPP. The EDPs would wear a ‘double-hat’: they would be part of the 
EPPO, but they would also remain members of the national Public Prosecutor’s Office.130 The 
Commission proposed giving the EPPO two types of competences. The first and substantive 
(but also exclusive) competence of the EPPO would consist of investigating and prosecuting 
‘criminal offences affecting the financial interests of the Union’.131 The second and ancillary 
competence would enable the EPPO to prosecute crimes ‘inextricably linked’ with 
embezzlement of EU money and where ‘their joint investigation and prosecution are in the 
interest of a good administration of justice’.132 
Just like in the first yellow card, the reasoned opinions that resulted in the second yellow card 
were not only preoccupied with the subsidiarity principle, but they also remarked negatively 
on the proportionality, the legal basis and the political merits of the EPPO proposal. But in 
contrast to the first yellow card, the majority of national parliaments was indeed solely 
focused on assessing whether the EPPO proposal complied with the subsidiarity principle and 
eventually concluded that the proposal should be scrapped because it was not in accordance 
with the principle of subsidiarity. In their reasoned opinions, national chambers alluded to 
both the material and procedural dimension of the subsidiarity principle. With regard to 
material subsidiarity, some national parliaments observed that the EPPO proposal failed the  
‘national insufficiency test’ because national efforts making use of national criminal law to 
combat fraud with EU money were already sufficient and successful.133 The Commission was 
criticized for not having examined whether existing EU coordination mechanisms such as 
Eurojust and OLAF could be strengthened so as to make possible for national authorities to 
better achieve the objective of guarding the Union’s financial interests.134 It was also argued 
that the EPPO proposal did not meet the ‘comparative efficiency test’. National parliaments 
asserted that the objectives of the proposal could not be better accomplished at EU level for 
the insufficiences in the prosecution of criminal offences against the financial interests of the 
EU at the national level originated from problems which were intrinsic to the national systems 
and that as such, the EPPO proposal would not lead to better results regarding the unearthing 
of misuse of EU funds.135 Furthermore, national chambers opined that the EPPO proposal was 
not in conformity with the procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. They pointed out that 
the Commission did not provide a suitable justification for the proposal and that the impact 
assessment was not well designed enough for it to argue that national actions would not 
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suffice to tackle misappropriation with EU money.136 In addition, the quantitative indicators 
in the impact assessment were seen as not reliable as the Commission was chastised for 
providing a projection of the costs and benefits of the proposal which lacked credibility.137 
There were also national parliaments that posited that the Union lacked the competence to act 
in this specific and sensitive area. Devising penal legislation was a matter for the Member 
States as criminal law was seen primarily as a national competence.138 National parliaments 
also criticized the EPPO proposal on proportionality grounds. The Commission was chided 
for opting for a regulation in preference of a directive as the former was deemed to have a too 
restrictive effect on national policy space.139 National chambers also believed that the EPPO 
proposal disregarded the necessity test as it gave the EPPO the exclusive competence to 
investigate and prosecute offences affecting the Union’s financial interests.140 They likewise 
denounced the structure of the future EPPO which they regarded as too centralized and they 
instead pleaded for a collegial form of authority.141 Concerns were also raised about the wider 
substance of the proposal as the concept of ‘the Union’s financial interest’ was found to be 
vague.142 Moreover, the proposal was viewed as not affording the suspects the necessary level 
of protection of rights.143  
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2.8  Conclusion 
 
This chapter moved to the most important aspect of the EWM, namely the principle of 
subsidiarity. It showed that the subsidiarity principle was inserted for the first time into the 
Treaty of Maastricht as a general constitutional rule due to a number of factors such as 
preventing excessive centralization, increasing pluralism and the diversity of national values 
and alleviating the fears of Member States about a federal Europe. Besides, subsidiarity was 
regarded as an answer to the absence of a clear separation of different categories of 
competence in the Treaties and as a tool that would have a mediating function in the conflicts 
that would erupt between the Member States and the EU on the exercise of certain 
competences. This chapter also demonstrated that the principle of subsidiarity in the Lisbon 
Treaty has two conceptions: a material one and a procedural one. As can be seen in Article 5 
TEU, the material dimension comprises two tests – the national insufficiency test and the 
comparative efficiency test – that EU institutions have to carry out to answer the question 
whether supranational intervention in a given situation is warranted.  According to the 
national insufficiency test, the EU can only act if and in so far the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national level, whereas passing the comparative 
efficiency test requires proof that the objectives of the proposed action can really be 
accomplished in a better way at Union level than at the national level. And procedural 
subsidiarity refers to procedural steps that the EU institutions (especially the Commission) 
must enact in order to be able to proof that the two tests stipulated in Article 5 TEU have been 
implemented in a satisfactory way so that it will become easier to assess whether Union action 
is needed. Notwithstanding the two tests, the chapter also pointed out that the subsidiarity 
principle remains vague and contested and its enforcement suboptimal. And the uncertainties 
about the nature of subsidiarity can also be discerned in the discussions surrounding the 
EWM. National parliaments and academics have shown themselves to be divided about 
whether the EWM should be read in a legal or political way. Put another way, the question is 
asked whether national chambers should only pay attention to the subsidiarity princple in their 
analysis of draft legislative acts and whether they are also allowed to incorporate other 
elements such the legal basis, the proportionality principle and the substance of the proposal 
in their reasoned opinions. The first two yellow cards issued against the Monti II and EPPO 
proposal have showcased that they were characterized by a political interpretation of the 
EWM on the part of participating parliaments. The next and last chapter will focus on the 
Posted Workers Directive and the revision proposal of 2016. It will then discuss the third 
yellow card issued against the amendment proposal and it will answer the question whether 
the third yellow card was characterized by a legal or a political reading of the EWM.  
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3.  The third yellow card and the revision of the Posted Workers Directive 
The previous chapter showed that the first two yellow cards regarding respectively the Monti 
II and the EPPO proposals were characterized by a political reading of the EWM from the 
side of the national parliaments. It is therefore not surprising that this chapter will demonstrate 
that the third yellow card issued in 2016 continued this trend as national parliaments did not 
alter their approach when writing down the reasoned opinions. As in the first two yellow 
cards, national chambers did not confine their analysis of the amendment proposal of the 
Posted Workers Directive to the subsidiarity principle. This chapter is structured as follows. It 
begins by discussing the Posted Workers Directive and the proposal to amend the Posted 
Workers Directive. The second section will focus on the third yellow card itself as it will 
delve succinctly into the reasoned opinions that national parliaments wrote to argue that the 
amendment of the Posted Workers Directive did not comply with the subsidiarity principle.   
 
3.1  The short history and the contents of the Posted Workers Directive 
 
In contrast to the first two yellow cards, the third yellow card was issued against a proposal 
that amended an existing directive. Whereas the Monti II and the EPPO proposals intended to 
establish EU coordination and regulation in policy areas sensitive for Member States and 
which hitherto had been untouched by European rules, the Commission proposal of 2016 to 
revisit the regulatory framework for posted workers aimed to add new rules to a field that 
since the 1990s had already been subject to (minimal) EU coordination and harmonisation. It 
was namely in 1996 that Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the 
framework of the provision of services was adopted after a long legislative process that took 
five years.144 Although the contours of the Posted Workers Directive were already visible in 
the 1970s, the issue of posted workers did not become pertinent until the enlargement of 1986 
when Spain and Portugal joined the European Communities.145 The Accession Treaties 
stipulated that Spanish and Portuguese workers could not immediately rely on the provisions 
on the free movement of workers due to transitional arrangements, but they could be sent to 
other Member States by companies from Spain and Portugal in the context of the freedom to 
provide services.146 It is important to bear in mind that at that time there was no distinction in 
European law between workers under the Treaties and those that are now regarded as posted 
workers. This differentiation was established by the European Court of Justice in the seminal 
case Rush Portuguesa in 1990 when it ruled that posted workers could be distinguished from 
workers who enjoyed rights under the free movement of workers (ex Article 39 TEC and now 
Article 45 TFEU).147 It followed from this that posted workers could not be entitled to the 
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principle of equal treatment.148 At the same time, the Court also allowed Member States to 
impose all national labour legislation on foreign services providers and their workers.149  
The Court ruling in the Rush case and the effects of enlargement prompted the Commission to 
come up with a legislative proposal to regulate the question of posted workers. The European 
legislators subsequently managed to agree on a text which codified the case law of the Court 
to a great extent. The Posted Workers Directive which has been described as complex and 
even obscure150 in parts has two main objectives: facilitating the transnational provision of 
services within a climate of fair competition and providing protection to posted workers.151 
But as developments in the 2000s have shown, the primary aim of the Directive has turned out 
to be the cross-border provision of services.152 The Directive’s strong focus on the smooth 
functioning of the internal market can also be seen in the legal bases that were chosen, namely 
the freedom of establishment and service provisions.  
Even though the Directive has been characterized as complex and obscure, the Directive itself 
is very short and the most relevant aspects can be found in the first three Articles. The 
Directive defines a posted worker as ‘a worker who, for a limited period, carries out his work 
in the territory of a Member State other than the State in which he normally works’.153 
Furthermore, the Directive lists three types of posting: ‘normal’ posting, whereby companies 
send workers to another Member State with the objective to provide services in that State, 
intra-corporate posting and posting through temporary employment undertakings or 
placement agencies.154 The core of the Directive can be found in Article 3(1) which lays down 
a nucleus of minimum protective rights that the host Member States must guarantee to posted 
workers on their territory. These terms and conditions of employment include working time 
and annual holidays, minimum rates of pay, conditions of hiring-out of workers, health, safety 
and hygiene at work, measures which protect pregnant women and young people, and equality 
of treatment between men and women and these must be laid down by law, regulation or 
administrative provision155, and/or by collective agreements or arbitration awards which have 
been declared universally applicable and if they concern the construction industry. Article 
3(7) allows the Member States to impose more favourable standards than those mentioned in 
Article 3(1)156, whereas Article 3(9) gives national authorities the option to oblige 
undertakings to guarantee to posted temporary agency workers those terms and conditions 
which apply to national temporary agency workers.157 Article 3(10) enables Member States in 
cases of public policy provisions to apply national terms and conditions on issues other than 
those referred to in Article 3(1) to national and Member State undertakings.158 Moreover, 
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Article 3(10) gives Member States the possibility to apply to national and Member State 
undertakings terms and conditions of employment laid down in the collective agreements or 
arbitration awards within the meaning of Article 3(8) and in areas other than the construction 
sector.  
 
3.2  The revision process of the Posted Workers Directive and the proposed amendments 
to the Posted Workers Directive 
 
The decision of the Commission to revise the Posted Workers Directive in 2016 can be 
attributed to changed circumstances. In 2004, the EU was expanded to the East (and the 
South) as several East European countries joined the European family. The enlargement from 
15 to 25 and subsequently 28 Member States has meant that the Union has become much 
more diverse with regard to its socio-economic makeup; the EU-15 and EU-10 have indeed 
very different wage levels and social security coverage.159 This has created a situation 
whereby simultaneously fulfilling the twin objectives of the Posted Workers Directive, 
namely the transnational provision of services within a climate of fair competition and the 
protection of posted (and national) workers has become considerably difficult in certain 
sectors. Another factor that led to the initiative to revise the Posted Workers Directive was the 
Court ruling in the Laval case. In the Laval case, the Court established that Article 3(7) could 
not be used by Member States to apply higher standards to posted workers and that the Posted 
Workers Directive was in fact a ceiling with respect to the social protection of workers.160 
What also provided an impetus for the revision of the Posted Workers Directive to reach the 
top political agenda was the change of power at the presidency of the European Commission. 
The Barroso Commission was mostly preoccupied with the eurozone crisis and was only 
interested to improve the implementation of the Posted Workers Directive which it did 
through the introduction of the Enforcement Directive in early 2014, whereas Jean-Claude 
Juncker, the first ‘Spitzenkandidat’ to become Commission President, had explicitly 
campaigned on social issues and desired to achieve ‘Social Triple A Rating’ for Europe.161  
It has become clear that the ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 and the Laval Court ruling have 
demonstrated the problems associated with posting and have given posting a somewhat 
negative reputation. At the same time, however, it is important not to overestimate the 
problems of posting and to correct some misconceptions about posting. Posting remains a 
limited phenomenon as only 0.6 per cent of the EU working population can be regarded as 
posted, which comprise 2 million people.162 Moreover, statistical data have shown that the 
phenomenon of posting is not dominated by posted workers from low-wage Member States 
being sent to work in old and high-wage Member States; two third of postings involve 
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postings between high-wage Member States.163 Even though, posted workers are highly 
concentrated in sectors, such as manufacturing and construction which demand medium- and 
low-skilled workers, posting also occurs in so-called highly-skilled professions, such as in 
education, health, social work services and business services.164 Furthermore, posting has the 
potential to contribute to increasing employment and decreasing unemployment and allowing 
a worker to develop professionally and enabling a company to grow more through a more 
diversified workforce.165 This does not of course negate the fact that in some sectors such as 
construction and manufacturing, posting can indeed lead to wage competition, social 
dumping, abuse of workers and loss of jobs.166 Therefore, the Commission proposal to revise 
the regulatory framework governing the posting of workers must be seen as an attempt to 
enhance the legitimacy of posting by making it more social.  
It was on 8 March 2016 that as part of a broader mobility package the Commission presented 
its proposal to revisit the Posted Workers Directive. The proposal had the same aims as the 
Directive that it was trying to amend and was also based on the internal market legal bases, 
namely the provisions on free movement of services and establishment (Articles 53(1) and 62 
TFEU). Although the Commission did not opt for an additional social policy legal base, it did 
reserve space for the social objectives of the internal market and the Union in the preamble. 
As such, recital 4 of the preamble states that after twenty years, it was necessary to assess 
whether the Posted Worker Directive still struck the right balance between the need to 
promote the freedom to provide services and the need to protect the rights of posted 
workers.167 Furthermore, recital 3 of the preamble stressed that according to Article 3 TEU 
and Article 9 TFEU, the Union had the task to promote social justice and protection and to 
encourage a high level of employment, to guarantee an adequate social protection and to 
combat social exclusion.168 Recital 11 of the preamble also highlighted that in a competitive 
single market, service providers should not only compete on labour costs but also on other 
components such as productivity and efficiency, or the quality and innovation of their goods 
and services.169 
The revision proposal showed that the Commission attempted to make a more social use of 
the internal market legal bases. The Commission wanted to establish a new consensus 
whereby additional rights for posted workers would not be regarded as obstacles for the 
freedom to provide cross-border services. The amendments to the Posted Workers Directive 
solely focused on improving the rights of posted workers. The revision proposal scrapped the 
obligation of host Member States to impose minimum rates of pay and replaced the phrase 
‘minimum rates of pay’ with the term ‘remuneration’ in Article 3(1), thereby inaugurating the 
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principle of ‘equal pay for equal work at the same place’.170 Member States will be required to 
publish on a website the constituent elements of remuneration.171 Rules on remuneration 
applicable to national workers emanating from legislation and collective agreements would 
also apply to posted workers. Moreover, provisions from collective agreements declared 
universally applicable would apply to posted workers in all sectors of the economy, whereas 
previously this had been the case only in the construction sector.172 Furthermore, the 
amendment proposal stipulated that posted and local temporary agency workers would be 
entitled to the same rights with regard to remuneration and other working conditions.173 
Posted workers would also enjoy additional host Member State labour rights if their term of 
posting lasted more than 24 months.174  
The revision of the Posted Workers Directive intended to initiate a process which I would 
describe as ‘re-nationalization through Europeanization’ by which I mean that legislation at 
EU level would help contribute to increasing the national policy space concerning the rates of 
pay. In other words, the revised directive would enable Member States to apply rules of 
remuneration stemming from legislation and collective agreements instead of minimum 
wages to posted workers. But not all Member States and their national parliaments were 
enchanted with the process of amending the framework governing the posted workers. In fact, 
the issuing of a yellow card against the proposal to revise the Posted Workers Directive was 
not a surprise and could already be foreshadowed a year before the revision proposal was 
presented. In 2015, the Commission was sent two letters – the first one delivered on 18 June 
2015 by Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Sweden and 
the second one sent on 31 August 2015 by Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia and Romania – in the consultation phase of the ‘targeted’ 
revision of the Posted Workers Directive.175 Whereas the first missive was in favour of a 
revamp of the Posted Workers Directive, the second letter submitted by Baltic and East 
European members of the Union found the revision to be premature as the deadline for the 
transposition of the Enforcement Directive had not passed and its effects could not be 
thoroughly evaluated.176  
The letter sent by Member States who had joined the EU after 2004 could not convince the 
Commission to stop the presentation of the revision proposal in 2016. At the same time, the 
opposition from the abovementioned Member States did not abate when the Commission 
revealed its amendment proposal. In May 2016, the third yellow card became a fact when 14 
national chambers sent reasoned opinions to the Commission.177 These reasoned opinions 
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originated from 11 Member States178 whose representatives except for Croatia and Denmark 
had also sent a letter complaining about the plan of the Commission to revisit the Posted 
Workers Directive. In constrast to the first two yellow cards, the third yellow card was 
characterized by a deep division between old and new Member States; 10 out of 11 Member 
States whose parliaments took part in writing reasoned opinions were Baltic and East 
European. But the third yellow card was also marked by continuity as the reasoned opinions 
not only discussed the subsidiarity principle but also zoomed in on other topics such as the 
legal basis, the proportionality and the content of the revision proposal.  
 
3.3  The reasoned opinions of national parliaments 
 
In the reasoned opinions, national parliaments paid attention to both the material and 
procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. In reference to the material aspect of subsidiarity, 
national chambers remarked that the Commission did not argue convincingly that the 
objectives mentioned in the revision proposal could not be achieved sufficiently at the 
national level.179 They pointed out that the goals of the provisions inserted in the revision 
proposal – providing equivalent protection to posted temporary agency workers in relation to 
national temporary agency workers and enabling Member States to extend universally 
applicable collective agreements to all economic sectors – could already be achieved by 
making use of the existing directive.180 It was argued that the new amended proposal would 
not add anything new because the Posted Workers Directive and the Enforcement Directive 
already gave posted workers sufficient social protection.181 But when it came to subsidiarity-
related criticism, the bulk of reasoned opinions castigated the Commission for violating the 
procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. The revision proposal was criticized for not 
having a comprehensive subsidiarity justification as the Commission merely mentioned that 
the existing directive could only be amended by a new directive.182 Moreover, the impact 
assessment was deemed by some national parliaments to be badly designed as it did not 
provide analysis on the impact of the proposal on specific economic sectors, was not based on 
trustworthy data and did not set out the financial impact of the proposal, thereby making it 
difficult for national parliamentarians to gauge the real impact of the introduction of 
remuneration.183 The impact study was also chastised for not being supported by quantitative 
and qualitative indicators.184 Furthermore, the Commission was denounced for having failed 
to consult the social partners in an extensive manner and it was accused of neglecting the 
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regional and local elements of the issue at hand.185 Seen from the perspective of national 
parliaments, the non-compliance of the Commission with the procedural side of the 
subsidiarity principle undoubtedly hampered their efforts to assess whether the objectives of 
revision proposal could really be attained at the European level.  
As mentioned earlier, national parliamentarians did not limit their analysis of the revision 
proposal to the control of subsidiarity, but they also focused on other topics. National 
chambers complained that the Commission violated the provisions in the Treaty on the free 
movement of services by introducing the notion of remuneration, thereby restricting 
opportunities for companies which provide cross-border services and thus leading to more 
costly services.186 Moreover, the proposal was disparaged for not respecting Articles 152 and 
153 TFEU. It was asserted that the proposal breached Article 152 TFEU by not respecting in 
an adequate way the autonomy of social parters and their tasks within the collective 
negotiation.187 By establishing the concept of remuneration for posted workers, the 
Commission infringed Article 153(5) TFEU which states that rules relating to pay shall not be 
legislated by the supranational level.188 These are all issues which deal with the legal basis 
and not with the subsidiarity aspects of the revision proposal. National parliaments also 
argued that the amendment proposal did not comply with the proportionality principle as the 
revised directive would add additional administrative burdens for undertakings engaged in 
providing cross-border services.189 The disproportionate burden would result in a limitation of 
the free movement of services which would contradict the aim of facilitating the transnational 
provision of services stipulated in the directive. The Commission was also criticized for 
designing a legislative text which was too intrusive because it tried to forcefully approximate 
the wage levels in the EU.190 Lastly, concerns were put forward about the content of the 
proposal. National parliaments criticized the concept of remuneration as being too vague191 
and regarded the intention of the Commission to diminish the wage competition to be 
misguided as other differences that affect fair competitive conditions were not given much 
attention in the revision proposal.192  
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3.4  Conclusion 
 
This chapter was entirely dedicated to the third yellow card issued against the proposal to 
amend the Posted Workers Directive. The first section of the chapter took stock of the Posted 
Workers Directive adopted in 1996 and the revision proposal of 2016. It laid out that this 
Directive has two main objectives: facilitating the transnational provision of services within a 
climate of fair competition and providing protection to posted workers. The centerpiece of 
this Directive is Article 3 which stipulates that Member States must provide posted workers 
with a nucleus of minimum protective rights. The impetus to revise the Directive in 2016 had 
to do with the acknowledgement that a lot (enlargement and the Laval Quartet) had changed 
in twenty years time and that these events had had a negative influence on the balance struck 
between the two abovementioned objectives. The amendment proposal introduced the 
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work at the same place’, whereby Member States would be 
required to impose the national level of remuneration on posted workers instead of minimum 
rates of pay. Moreover, it stated that provisions from collective agreements declared 
universally applicable would apply to posted workers in all sectors of the economy, whereas 
previously this had been the case only in the construction sector and it stipulated that posted 
and local temporary agency workers would be entitled to the same rights with regard to 
remuneration and other working conditions. Posted workers would also enjoy additional host 
Member State labour rights if their term of posting lasted more than 24 months. The second 
part of the chapter delved into the reasoned opinions that constituted the third yellow card. It 
found that the third yellow card just like the previous two yellow cards was also characterized 
by a political reading, whereby national parliaments focused not just on the subsidiarity 
principle but also on the legal basis, the proportionality principle and the content of the 
revision proposal. In the reasoned opinions, national parliaments paid attention to both the 
material and procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. In reference to the material aspect of 
subsidiarity, national chambers remarked that the Commission did not argue convincingly that 
the objectives mentioned in the revision proposal could not be achieved sufficiently at the 
national level. However, the bulk of reasoned opinions castigated the Commission for 
violating the procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. The revision proposal was criticized 
for not having a comprehensive subsidiarity justification, for having a badly designed impact 
study and for not initiating extensive consultations with social partners. With regard to the 
legal basis, national chambers complained that the Commission violated the provisions in the 
Treaty on the free movement of services and that it did not respect Articles 152 and 153 
TFEU. National parliaments also argued that the amended proposal did not comply with the 
proportionality principle as the revised directive was deemed to be too intrusive because it 
tried to forcefully approximate the wage levels in the EU. And it would also add additional 
administrative burdens for undertakings engaged in providing cross-border services. Lastly, 
concerns were put forward about the content of the proposal. National parliaments criticized 
the concept of remuneration as being too vague and regarded the intention of the Commission 
to diminish the wage competition to be misguided as other differences that affect fair 
competitive conditions were not given much attention in the revision proposal. 
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Conclusion 
The thesis has had as its aim to answer the question whether the third yellow card was 
characterized by a strictly legal or a political reading. Put differently, it wanted to figure out 
whether the reasoned opinions of national parliaments that coalesced into the third yellow 
card were solely preoccupied with the subsidiarity principle and whether they also focused on 
other elements such as the legal basis, the proportionality principle and the substance of the 
proposal. Before answering this central question, it established in the first chapter that the 
Treaty of Lisbon has considerably strengthened the position of national parliaments and this 
can be seen in Articles 10 and 12 TEU. Article 10 TEU states clearly that the Member State 
governments sitting in the Council are democratically accountable to their national 
parliaments, whereas Article 12 TEU is entirely dedicated to the role of national parliaments 
in the EU. This Article stipulates that national parliaments contibute to the good functioning 
of the EU by taking part in the revision procedures of the Treaties according to Article 48 
TEU, by being informed of applications for accession tot he EU according to Article 49 TEU, 
by participating in the evaluation mechanisms for the implementation of Union policies in the 
area of freedom, security and justice according to Article 70 TFEU and by being involved in 
the supervision of Europol’s and Eurojust’s activities according to Articles 85 and 88 TFEU. 
Furthermore, Article 12 TEU expounds that in accordance with the Protocol on the role of 
national parliaments in the EU –also known as Protocol 1 – national parliaments will be 
informed by the institutions of the Union, they will be given the draft legislative acts of the 
EU and they shall partake in inter-parliamentary cooperation between national parliaments 
and with the European Parliament. But the most important and innovative provision 
ensconced in Article 12 TEU is the one dealing with subsidiarity monitoring as national 
parliaments are given the right to control draft legislative acts on the principle of subsidiarity 
in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality also known as Protocol 2. The subsidiarity monitoring system which is better 
known as the ‘Early Warning Mechanism’ (EWM) and which consists of a yellow and orange 
card procedure was introduced to lessen the democratic deficit of the EU and to hinder the 
process of competence creep. In the first chapter, it was pointed out that the EWM has certain 
virtues and deficiences. On the one hand, EWM has the potential to increase the democratic 
legitimacy of the EU decision-making process and to delay the legislative process when 
national parliaments object to draft legislative acts. On the other hand, the EWM also has 
serious shortcomings as evidenced by the eight-week period, the difficulties to coordinate 
with other national parliaments in this short period and the obfuscation of representative 
democracy in the EU.  
The second chapter moved to the most important aspect of the EWM, namely the principle of 
subsidiarity. It showed that the subsidiarity principle was inserted for the first time into the 
Treaty of Maastricht as a general constitutional rule due to a number of factors such as 
preventing excessive centralization, increasing pluralism and the diversity of national values 
and alleviating the fears of Member States about a federal Europe. Besides, subsidiarity was 
regarded as an answer to the absence of a clear separation of different categories of 
competence in the Treaties and as a tool that would have a mediating function in the conflicts 
that would erupt between the Member States and the EU on the exercise of certain 
competences. This chapter also demonstrated that the principle of subsidiarity in the Lisbon 
Treaty has two conceptions: a material one and a procedural one. As can be seen in Article 5 
TEU, the material dimension comprises two tests – the national insufficiency test and the 
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comparative efficiency test – that EU institutions have to carry out to answer the question 
whether supranational intervention in a given situation is warranted.  According to the 
national insufficiency test, the EU can only act if and in so far the objectives of the proposed 
action cannot be sufficiently achieved at the national level, whereas passing the comparative 
efficiency test requires proof that the objectives of the proposed action can really be 
accomplished in a better way at Union level than at the national level. And procedural 
subsidiarity refers to procedural steps that the EU institutions (especially the Commission) 
must enact in order to be able to proof that the two tests stipulated in Article 5 TEU have been 
implemented in a satisfactory way so that it will become easier to assess whether Union action 
is needed. Notwithstanding the two tests, the chapter also pointed out that the subsidiarity 
principle remains vague and contested and its enforcement suboptimal. And the uncertainties 
about the nature of subsidiarity can also be discerned in the discussions surrounding the 
EWM. National parliaments and academics have shown themselves to be divided about 
whether the EWM should be read in a legal or political way. Put another way, the question is 
asked whether national chambers should only pay attention to the subsidiarity princple in their 
analysis of draft legislative acts and whether they are also allowed to incorporate other 
elements such the legal basis, the proportionality principle and the substance of the proposal 
in their reasoned opinions. The first two yellow cards issued against the Monti II and EPPO 
proposal have showcased that they were characterized by a political interpretation of the 
EWM from the side of participating parliaments.  
The last chapter was entirely dedicated to the third yellow card issued against the proposal to 
amend the Posted Workers Directive. The first section of the chapter took stock of the Posted 
Workers Directive adopted in 1996 and the revision proposal of 2016. It laid out that this 
Directive has two main objectives: facilitating the transnational provision of services within a 
climate of fair competition and providing protection to posted workers. The centerpiece of 
this Directive is Article 3 which stipulates that Member States must provide posted workers 
with a nucleus of minimum protective rights. The impetus to revise the Directive in 2016 had 
to do with the acknowledgement that a lot (enlargement and the Laval Quartet) had changed 
in twenty years time and that these events had had a negative influence on the balance struck 
between the two abovementioned objectives. The amendment proposal introduced the 
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work at the same place’, whereby Member States would be 
required to impose the national level of remuneration on posted workers instead of minimum 
rates of pay. Moreover, it stated that provisions from collective agreements declared 
universally applicable would apply to posted workers in all sectors of the economy, whereas 
previously this had been the case only in the construction sector and it stipulated that posted 
and local temporary agency workers would be entitled to the same rights with regard to 
remuneration and other working conditions. Posted workers would also enjoy additional host 
Member State labour rights if their term of posting lasted more than 24 months. The second 
part of the chapter delved into the reasoned opinions that constituted the third yellow card. It 
found that the third yellow card just like the previous two yellow cards was also characterized 
by a political reading, whereby national parliaments focused not just on the subsidiarity 
principle but also on the legal basis, the proportionality principle and the content of the 
revision proposal. In the reasoned opinions, national parliaments paid attention to both the 
material and procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. In reference to the material aspect of 
subsidiarity, national chambers remarked that the Commission did not argue convincingly that 
the objectives mentioned in the revision proposal could not be achieved sufficiently at the 
national level. However, the bulk of reasoned opinions castigated the Commission for 
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violating the procedural side of the subsidiarity principle. The revision proposal was criticized 
for not having a comprehensive subsidiarity justification, for having a badly designed impact 
study and for not initiating extensive consultations with social partners. With regard to the 
legal basis, national chambers complained that the Commission violated the provisions in the 
Treaty on the free movement of services and that it did not respect Articles 152 and 153 
TFEU. National parliaments also argued that the amended proposal did not comply with the 
proportionality principle as the revised directive was deemed to be too intrusive because it 
tried to forcefully approximate the wage levels in the EU. And it would also add additional 
administrative burdens for undertakings engaged in providing cross-border services. Lastly, 
concerns were put forward about the content of the proposal. National parliaments criticized 
the concept of remuneration as being too vague and regarded the intention of the Commission 
to diminish the wage competition to be misguided as other differences that affect fair 
competitive conditions were not given much attention in the revision proposal.  
This thesis has shown that the third yellow card was characterized by a political reading from 
the side of national parliaments. In other words, national chambers not only focused on the 
principle of subsidiarity in their analysis of the revision of the Posted Workers Directive as 
they also engaged in scrutinizing other elements such the legal basis, the proportionality 
principle and the substance of the proposal itself. In fact, all the three yellow cards were 
interpreted in a political manner and they highlighted the differences in opinion between 
national parliaments and the Commission with regard to the appropriate way to protect the 
European single market and budget and how to do it in a way that it would not come at the 
expense of ordinary workers and recipients. It would be interesting to delve deeper into the 
aftermath of the three yellow cards and the other reasoned opinions issued within the 
framework of the EWM and which did not lead yellow cards. The reaction of the Commission 
to the issuing of the yellow cards and the precise influence of the yellow cards on the course 
of the legislative process deserve to be researched in greater detail. Moreover, it would be 
important to answer the question whether the political interpretation of the EWM seen in the 
three yellow cards was an aberration or whether the majority of the reasoned opinions indeed 
focused on other elements than just the subsidiarity principle. If national parliaments 
generally use a political interpretation of the EWM when analyzing draft legislative acts, then 
it would be legitimate to ask whether the Treaties should be changed to reflect the new reality. 
On the other hand, the fact that the three yellow cards were characterized by a political 
interpretation of the EWM could also lead one to conclude that national parliaments have not 
complied with Protocol 2 of the Lisbon Treaty and that therefore the EWM needs to be ‘re-
nationalized’ which would entail the removal of it from the Treaty in order to enable the 
national chambers to scrutinize the draft legislative acts from all angles and to mandate and 
better control their governments in the Council. 
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